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GERMANY'S NEW TELECOMMUNICATION LAW 
Arval A. Morris* 
This article is a critical, comparative introduction to West 
Germany's new telecommunication law that suggests solutions to 
some of the problems the new law creates but does not address. 
The world currently is passing through a period in . which the fruits 
of the third technological revolution are being diffused.1 Part of 
that revolution is a new telecommunications technology that effi-
ciently links computers, microelectronics and telephone lines, cre-
ating an information technology of advanced voice, video and data 
processing that is revolutionizing social and economic affairs. Dif-
fusion of the new technology is uneven, repeatedly running 
squarely into restrictive and highly protective national telecommu-
nications monopolies, which tend to be large, sluggish and wedded 
to the status quo. Yet, the world's telecommunication economy is 
changing as rapidly as governments permit the emerging technolo-
gies to be exploited. 2 
Government regulations both at the national and international 
levels, however, often lag behind, are often sorely outdated, and 
frequently hamper attempts to modernize. When the regulations 
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1. See Bell, The Third Technological Revolution and Its Possible Socioeconomic Con-
sequences, DISSENT, Spring 1989, at 164-76 ; see also D. BELL, THE COMING OF PosT-INous-
TRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973). 
2. The telecommunications revolution apparently began in the United States but is 
rapidly spreading throughout the world where business and other opportunities similar to 
those found in the United States may develop. "A measure of the commercial significance 
accorded telecommunication capabilities is the growth seen in their relative share of the 
United States Gross National Product (GNP). Twenty years ago, communications and com-
puter data processing, narrowly defined, accounted for slightly less than 2. 7 percent of an 
$892.7 billion, 1968 U.S. GNP. Today, they exceed six percent of a forecast 1988 $4.9 trillion 
GNP." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA TELECOM-2000, at 25 (1988) [hereinafter 
TELECOM-2000]. The stakes and the players are mammoth. For example, the size of Ja-
pan's Nippon Telephone and Telegraph "is staggering. Even though the recent scandal has 
pushed its stock price to record lows-currently 1.44 million yen ($10,900) a share-its mar-
ket capitalization is still the equivalent of $169.2 billion, bigger than International Business 
Machines Corp., General Motors Corp. and American Telephone and Telegraph Co. com-
bined." Int'l Herald Tribune, Apr. 19, 1989, at 19. 
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are current, they tend to be episodic, seemingly more designed to 
defuse existing trade crises than to anticipate and avoid them. 3 
However, constructive governmental regulation of telecommunica-
tions at the national level is stirring. It is beginning to look as 
though telecommunication atthe national level may become an ex-
ception to the general pattern of "crises defusion" regulation, even 
though some telecommunication changes seem to have been moti-
vated by the most provincial notions of national self-interest. In-
ternational governmental agreement and regulation aimed at gen-
erally developing and maintaining an open, stable, fair and 
vigorous international telecommunication order remain to be 
created." 
I. THE UNITED STATES: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 
Telecommunications developments in the United States are 
instructive. They represent an early response to demands of the 
third technological revolution, and provide a convenient bench-
mark for understanding and comparing developments in other 
countries, even though the United States institutional telecommu-
nications pattern traditionally has been distinctly different from 
those found in the rest of the world.5 The United States has had 
the greatest experience with competition in communications, and 
the world currently is moving towards more competition. It is use-
ful, therefore, to begin a comparative analysis of recent liberaliza-
tion in Germany with a brief synopsis of the development of Amer-
ican events. 
The United States' role in telecommunication developments is 
characterized by classic American commitments to individualism, 
private ownership of enterprises, strong legal protections for con-
tract and property rights, an unabiding faith in markets and al-
3. For a discussion of the responses of government to economic crises see P . 
GoUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
CRISES (1986). 
4. See, e.g., J . ARONSON & P. CowHEY, WHEN COUNTRIES TALK: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (1988) . 
5. For an overview, see TELECOM-2000, supra note 2; see also S. BARNET, M. BoTEIN 
& E. NOAM, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1988) ; U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE GEODESIC NETWORK (1987); G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN-
DUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (1981); Wiley, Competition And Deregula-
tion in Telecommunications: The American Experience, reprinted in E. MESTMACKER, 
KOMMUNIKATION 0HNE MONOPOLE 31-50 (1980) (I draw on these books, except where other-
wise indicated, for the remainder of the description of the American telecommunications 
industry) . 
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though waning somewhat recently, deep concern about the antiso-
cial, exploitative potential of private monopolies and large business 
concentrations. Because of the emphasis on private enterprise, the 
telecommunications roles played by United States governmental 
bodies have been more limited than in other countries. In the 
United States, government influence has been largely limited to 
ameliorating cases of market failure or providing for national de-
fense. Market failure exists whenever markets lack the necessary 
competitive structures and mechanisms to safeguard against devel-
oping antisocial concentrations of private economic power such 
that the market neither functions efficiently nor in socially benefi-
cial ways, usually because of certain "industry peculiarities." In 
such circumstances, monopoly exploitation, arbitrarily distorted 
prices and resource allocations can occur that generally lead to de-
mands for government action, usually resulting in some form of 
regulation. In telecommunications, chief among the more impor-
tant "industry peculiarities" are: the natural monopoly characteris-
tics found in telecommunications networks, an absence of property 
rights in the electromagnetic spectrum and public-good externali-
ties inherent in the legal requirement of universal service.6 As a 
6. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 places on the Federal Communication 
Commission the obligation to build a telecommunications system that will "make available, 
so far as possible to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and 
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges." 47 U.S.C. § 151(1) (1934). 
The theory of natural monopoly was not well developed in 1934 when the Communica-
tions Act was passed. It postulated the production of a single, identical commodity or ser-
vice and rested on the belief that economies of scale (declining average cost per unit of 
output) at least to the level of market output was enough in and of itself to show natural 
monopoly and would deter all possible competitive entry. The ability of a natural monopo-
list to repel profitable entry by using economies of scale was seen as justification for com-
plete regulation of the firm. It may well be justified if only one single identical commodity 
or service is involved. However, the modern theory of monopoly includes analyses of multi-
product outputs. It yields the counterintuitive conclusion that a natural monopolist is not 
necessarily protected against successful market entry by competitors if two or more com-
modities or services are produced, rather than only one. Moreover, the property of a monop-
oly being natural is now seen as a purely economic and technological function and can be 
estimated and expressed as a cost function, assuming a given level of market demand. In 
other words, a natural monopoly is present for a given level of production if one and only 
one firm can produce an entire level of production of one or more products at a lower cost 
than any two or more firms acting in concert. Thus, natural monopoly corresponds to what 
is known as the "subadditivity" of the cost function. See W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NAT-
URAL MONOPOLY (1982); W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLING, CONTEST.ABLE MARKETS AND 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Shepherd, "Contestability" vs. Competition, 74 
AM. EcoN. REV. 572 (1984). The modern theory is gravely limited in that it is static and does 
not account for bringing about technological change or new goods and services and it as-
sumes that all firms share the same technology. It also assumes that an incumbent will be 
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result of such peculiarities, most telephone, telex, telegraph and 
other basic communication services are provided by governmen-
tally regulated private firms known as "common carriers." 
A common carrier is an enterprise that either voluntarily holds 
itself out, or is expressly required by law, to provide transmission 
or some other basic telecommunication service on a non-discrimi-
natory basis to all financially qualified customers. 7 A regulated 
common carrier must sell or lease its transmission facilities or ser-
vices to all financially qualified members of the public (including 
resellers who thereby can compete directly with the common car-
rier), under rates (tariffs) and other conditions that have been ap-
proved by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a state 
regulatory agency, or both. Local telephone exchange companies 
must grant access to all long distance carriers and to all telephone 
users. No common carrier may control or censor the content of the 
information it transmits. Communication satellites,8 international 
and domestic long distance telephone networks, and local tele-
phone exchanges are all examples of common carriers. 
A. The Monopoly Era: The Rise of AT&T 
Until quite recently, the United States telecommunications in-
dustry was effectively a monopoly, consisting first and foremost of 
American Telephone and Tel.egraph Company (AT&T) plus a 
number of weaker and much smaller rivals. There was an early pe-
riod during which it looked as though competition might emerge in 
the industry (1893-1910), but AT&T's aggressive market behavior 
led the industry back into a basic, de facto monopoly.9 Until di-
passive in the face of competitive threats. Yet, it does show that the existence of a natural 
monopoly (in subadditivity terms) is a necessary, if not a sufficient condition, for prohibi-
tion of entry into a market. 
7. National Ass'n of Regulated Utility Comm. v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). The Federal Communication Act definition of a common car-
rier is neither adequate nor specific enough: a common carrier is a "common carrier for hire, 
in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio 
transmission of energy .... " 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1946). 
8. For a good discussion and overview of satellite communication, see M. SNOW, THE 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ORGANIZATION (INTELSAT) (1987). 
9. From 1907 to 1915, AT&T's few remaining competitors brought a mounting number 
of antitrust suits against it. In 1913, AT&T entered into the Kingsbury Commitment with 
the United States Department of Justice wherein AT&T sold its interest in Western Union, 
thereby leaving telegraphy never to return, guaranteed the then existing telephone compa-
nies access to its long distance network and agreed not to acquire its telephone competitors 
or their territories for AT&T's expansion purposes. AT&T focused much of its efforts in 
additional markets such as sound movie and commercial radio technology, but in 1921 the 
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vestment in 1984, AT&T was probably the most vertically inte-
grated telecommunications firm in the world, producing almost 
everything from all kinds of telecommunications equipment, con-
ducting research and providing long-distance transmission and lo-
cal service. 10 
Because of obvious market failure and a clear lack of any gen-
uine, robust competition, government regulation of interstate tele-
communication firms as common carriers came in 1934 when Con-
gress passed the Communications Act, 11 leaving the intrastate 
aspects of telecommunications for regulation by the states. For a 
long time the FCC and state regulatory bodies prohibited competi-
tion and preserved monopoly areas by carefully excluding telecom-
munication firms from each other's markets; moreover, the FCC 
set tariffs, guaranteed profits and other contracting conditions, and 
sought to prohibit the regulated companies, especially AT&T, from 
exploiting their monopoly powers. 
Courts were also involved. For example, in 1956, AT&T began 
operating for a period of about twenty-five years under a Consent 
Decree12 that ended a United States Department of Justice anti-
trust suit brought in 1949, restricting AT&T to its common carrier 
transmission status, and prohibiting AT&T, inter alia, from di-
rectly providing data processing and other enhanced telecommuni-
cation services. 
B. Movement Toward Deregulation and Reliance on 
Competition 
The present era is characterized by a policy shift from monop-
oly to deregulation and reliance on competition. It began effec-
restrictions were lifted and AT&T again began acquiring other telephone companies. By 
1934, when the Federal Communications Act was passed, AT&T owned eighty percent of all 
the telephones in the United States as well as the only national long-distance set of trans-
mission lines. 
10. 
Western Electric (now AT&T Technologies) produced both terminal and switching 
equipment: Long Lines Division (now AT&T Communications) provided ninety 
percent of the nation's long-distance traffic; Bell Labs (the only AT&T entity to 
survive without a name change) did basic research through a complex set of con-
tracts with the other AT&T components; and twenty-two wholly or majority-owned 
local telephone companies-such as New York Telephone Company or Southern 
Bell-provided local exchange service to one or more states. 
S. BARNET, M. BoTEIN & E. NOAM, supra note 5, at 24. 
11. Federal Communications Act, 14 U.S.C. § 151 (1949). 
12. United States v. Western Electric Co., No. 17-49 (D.N.J. 1956). This Consent De-
cree was later amended to provide for AT&T's recent divestment. See infra note 29. 
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tively in the mid-to-late 1960's when widespread business user 
needs for high-speed digital data communications (telephone lines 
plus computers) became clear, and new microwave technology was 
perceived as being able to overcome some of the "industry's natu-
ral monopoly peculiarities" in intercity telecommunications trans-
mission. The FCC studied the emerging problem in its First Com-
puter Inquiry (Computer 1),13 and reached five conclusions: (1) 
computer and communication services were in their infancy; (2) 
timely development of these services was crucial to overall United 
States economic growth and needs; (3) many users of existing tele-
phone communications capabilities were dissatisfied; ( 4) special 
private lines capable of being shaped to meet unique user needs 
were necessary and possible, particularly high speed data transmis-
sions and (5) the integrated office automation systems market 
should be subject to competition. Primarily as a result of these 
conclusions, the FCC began reassessing whether continued monop-
oly regulation or deregulation and competition was generally in the 
public interest. Deregulation ("liberalization") became the new 
philosophy. 
A judicial push toward deregulation and competition in termi-
nal equipment had come earlier in 1956 when the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals ruled that AT&T acted illegally when it 
followed its internal policy of allowing only its own customers' 
premises equipment (CPE) to be connected to its system, and re-
fused to allow the Hush-A-Phone to be connected to any of the 
telephones, which Bell Operating Companies owned and lucra-
tively rented to customers.14 Having lost, AT&T's position was 
that the court's decision was strictly restricted to its facts, not ap-
plying to other terminal equipment. However, while the Computer 
I inquiry was being processed, the FCC, in 1968, decided 
Carterfone,1"' ruling that AT&T must allow the non-AT&T-owned 
Carterfone16 to be interconnected to its lines because it did not 
adversely affect the telephone system, and because it satisfied an 
13. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). 
14. Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The Hush-A-Phone 
is a cup-like device that one places on the telephone handset to funnel the speaker's voice 
directly into the telephone instrument thereby facilitating telephone conversations in offices 
and other crowded places. 
15. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 240 (1968), reh'g denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 531 (1968). 
16. Thomas Carter marketed to private persons this device that acoustically and induc-
tively interconnected mobile radio systems with the national telephone system. AT&T re-
fused to allow the Carterfone to interconnect and the manufacturer petitioned the F.C.C. 
for relief. 
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unmet communications need. This ruling ultimately led to the 
FCC's creation of a Federal registration program for all terminal 
equipment, and to the current situation of full and free competi-
tion in the manufacture, sale and interconnection of all types of 
non-harmful, terminal equipment (CPE), from simple telephones 
to highly sophisticated office systems.17 
Network trunk lines have a similar history. Conditions facili-
tating the move towards deregulation and competition in network 
trunk lines and basic transmission services were created earlier in 
1959 with the FCC's Allocation of Frequencies18 decision. With 
that decision the FCC began to tear down legal monopoly barriers 
to new, self-contained network trunk lines. It did so by ruling that 
any responsible applicant for a private, non-common carrier micro-
wave transmission system from point-to-point would be granted 
entry and be authorized to operate even though other common car-
rier facilities existed that could provide service to the applicant. 
Because microwave technology was new and relatively cheap, many 
large businesses in need of self-contained telecommunications 
transmission service such as pipelines, railroads and mining opera-
tions bypassed the publicly switched network completely and con-
structed their own private microwave transmission systems to 
serve their communications needs. AT&T also developed a com-
petitive microwave technology capability within its own network. 
The FCC next created a specialized common carrier (SCC) 
status, and further stimulated competition among basic, trunk line 
common carriers. It granted Microwave Communications Incorpo-
rated's (MCI) application for market entry to provide specialized 
point-to-point, microwave common carrier services between Chi-
cago and St. Louis. The reason given was that the information flow 
between and within computers is based on digital technology, 
which microwave can handle, but the public telephone system, es-
17. The most important decisions instituting competition in terminal equipment were 
AT&T (Foreign Attachments), 15 F.C.C.2d 605, reh'g denied, 18 F.C.C.2d 871 (1969); First 
Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d (1975), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 
537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); Second Report and Order, 58 
F.C.C.2d 739 (1976), aff'd sub nom. 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977). 
18. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959). The 
post-World War II development of microwave telecommunications transmissions technology 
provided a technological means of overcoming the natural monopoly characteristics of 
leased-line transmission between and among cities, but a problem remained within cities. In 
the Allocation of Frequencies decision, the FCC found that a sufficient amount of micro-
wave channels existed fully to satisfy the reasonably foreseeable needs of common carriers 
and private inter-city, point-to-point microwave systems. 
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pecially local phone lines leaving office buildings, was, and largely 
still is, based on analog technology, which is best suited for voice 
(wave) transmission.19 Thus, although analog technologically can 
be converted into digital and vice-versa by modems,20 the FCC be-
lieved an intrinsic incompatibility existed between computer and 
data requirements on the one hand and the extensive transmission 
facilities needed to support the rapidly growing demand for them 
on the other. 21 
19. The general shift from a continuous wavelike analog (voice or sounds are waves) to 
digital transmission, which consists of discrete pulses, is a most notable development, espe-
cially when linked with microelectronics. Through digital switching, a telephone line be-
comes converted to the use of binary systems, which in turn permits data transmission, 
linkage with computers, all permitting transmission of extremely high quality sound record-
ings such as musical discs, and the development of information theory. On the last, see, e.g., 
C. SHANNON & W. WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1964); R. HAM-
MING, CODING AND INFORMATION THEORY (1980); M. USHER, INFORMATION THEORY FOR TECH-
NOLOGISTS (1984); Bharath, Information Theory, BYTE, Dec. 1987, at 291. 
Digital cable transmission links offer many advantages over analog. One of the most 
important is an improved error rate by greater elimination of noise, which tends to enter the 
system when analog's waves are boosted along by amplifiers: the error rate is about 1 in 107 
for digital but only 1 in 106 for "dial-up" analog. Rather than being amplified, digital signals 
are simply regenerated when they pass through network nodes. While analog's error rates 
are acceptable for voice transmissions, they are too high for reliable data transmissions, a 
crucial element of the information age. Additionally, analog lines provide only limited 
speeds for data transmission (the modem is only one of the bottlenecks), but very high-
speed data links are fully possible through digitalization. The third technological revolution, 
it seems, will produce the conversion of all previous systems into digital form. 
20. Modems are cumbersome but will be necessary until analog telephone lines are fully 
digitalized. The most widely used modem is capable of sending reliable data traffic over 
dial-up, analog telephone lines at 2,400 bits per second (bps), but newer 9,600 bps modems 
are available. Higher-quality analog leased lines can support modems operating up to 19,200 
bps. Companies that require high-speed data links cannot use modems and must either 
lease a special digital link from local and long-distance telephone companies such as those 
provided by AT&T Communications, which range from operating at 2,400 bps, to data and 
video transmission services, which operate at 1,544 megabits per second (commonly known 
as the Tl rate), or bypass part or all of the public telephone system by installing their own 
digital transmission lines, microwave or fiber-optic cable. See infra note 21. For discussion 
see Davis, Making Sense of the Telecommunications Circus, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 1985, 
at 20. 
21. Microwave was not the only new technology. Although microwave can establish a 
direct digital link and should not be overlooked because it is cheap to operate and offers 
acceptable error rates (1 in 1010 to 1 in 1012), it has drawbacks limiting its usefulness to 
certain situations. One is that it must have a clear "line of sight" between two end points. 
Another is the short transmission range and the tendency for rain or snow to interfere with 
transmissions at frequencies greater than 11 gigahertz, thereby requiring a much closer loca-
tion of tran.smitters, perhaps every six or seven miles. 
Developments in digitalized fiber optic cable transmission have clearly demonstrated 
that it, along with microelectronics and innovative software, are the keys to the future of 
telecommunications. Fiber optic cable delivers performances that simply cannot be matched 
by coaxial copper cables. Almost all of the digital capacity being installed today is fiber-
optic cable, which is dazzlingly fast, can support huge amounts of traffic and provides ex-
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In expressing a concern over this problem, the FCC, in its 
Specialized Common Carrier decision,22 ruled over AT&T's objec-
tions that specialized common carriers (SCC) should be allowed to 
enter the basic trunk line transmission market freely because secs 
were developing new markets and services that met otherwise un-
met communication needs. In addition, it ruled that competition in 
the area would promote technical innovation of enhanced telecom-
munications services, and that AT&T's local Bell Operating Com-
panies (BOCs) must afford SCCs reasonable interconnection ser-
vices similar to those provided AT&T, so the SC Cs could reach 
and serve local customers. This decision was a long step toward 
creating competition among basic networks. One year later, in 
1972, the FCC adopted a similar competitive entry policy toward 
domestic satellite communications networks. Furthermore, it 
sought to make free market entry economically meaningful by pro-
tecting new competitors from AT&T's existing economic strength 
by prohibiting AT&T for three years from using its satellite facili-
ties for private line services. 23 
It was an easy next step to institute competition in local area 
tremely reliable transmission. Since 1980 some thirteen million kilometers of fiber-optic 
lines have been installed in Europe, America and Asia, and that figure is expected to double 
by 1993. To function, the telephone voice channel needs only a narrow frequency bandwidth 
of 3.1 kilohertz. Microwave transmissions work at one million times this frequency, and the 
infra-red light transmission of fiber-optics has a frequency 100,000 million times greater 
than telephone's conventional voice channel. 
The discovery in the 1970's that infrared light can be propagated economically within 
glass fibers gave rise to opto-electronics. A single fiber-optic line consists of a core made of 
glass or plastic the thickness of a human hair, a cladding that surrounds the core to reduce 
light-scattering loss and a buff er coating to protect against physical damage. A typical fiber-
optic cable is about the size of a garden hose and consists of 144 glass fibers; each fiber can 
support four thousand voice channels or two thousand conversations. In April 1989, a fiber-
optic cable was completed across the Pacific Ocean. It can carry forty thousand simultane-
ous telephone conversations, compared with the previous maximum of six thousand transpa-
cific calls handled by standard coaxial cable and satellites. Fiber-optic cable induced error is 
most rare; transmission is almost at the speed of light, and a completely digitalized fiber 
optic telephone system, reaching all American residences and business offices, ("the 
Superpipe") is clearly the wave of the future. For discussion, see R. PEPPER, THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED BROAD BAND NETWORKS, REGULATORY POLICY AND INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE (1988)(Working paper prepared for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion Office of Plans & Policy). U.S. Sprint is the only United States long distance carrier 
with a nationwide fiber-optic network, but Sprint's advantage may "slowly slip away as 
AT&T and MCI install it in their long distance network." Int'l Herald Tribune, June 12, 
1989, at 13. 
22. 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Trans. Comm'n v. FCC, 
513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). 
23. First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970); Second Report and Order, 35 
F.C.C.2d 844 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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networks · (LANs). Under FCC rulings and because they all are 
common carriers, AT&T and all its new network competitors must 
sell or lease basic transmission services on a non-discriminatory 
basis to any financially qualified user, including resellers. To meet 
an organization's internal and external communication needs that 
will permit data and other communication links among a com-
pany's computers, telephones, or both, large enterprises may lease 
or buy a complete local system, lease a telecommunication line, or 
privately install their own lines and then create their own local 
area networks. LANs in turn can be coupled to either a privately-
owned (PBX) or a leased switch from the telephone company to 
gain access lines connecting them to the outside world.24 
In addition to fostering LANs, the FCC in the 1970s further 
increased competition in telecommunications in an important area 
by stimulating the development of value-added networks (VANs). 
An enhanced or additional service is "value-added" when it is su-
perimposed onto the basic, "plain-old-telephone" network trans-
mission service.26 VANs provide enhanced services for consumers 
and primarily consist of software plus a switch. They are special-
ized, "intelligent" data networks geared to specific users' needs 
and offer advanced data and other services that go beyond the ba-
sic transmission services offered by network common carriers, i.e., 
voice and data channels plus switches to route signals to their in-
tended destination. Except for those provided by the common car-
riers themselves, other owners' VANS must be hooked up to com-
mon carrier network lines in order to sell and deliver their services 
to ultimate customers. 
Packet switching with protocol conversion can occur on public 
packet networks or on privately-owned bypass networks. In 1973, 
the VAN market saw heavy competition when the FCC approved a 
packet switching communications network offered by Packet Com-
24. LAN vendors now compete for business, selling LAN systems that will carry data at 
one to ten million bits per second (Mbps). This will considerably enhance business possibili-
ties such as computer-aided design, or engineering, etc. The Bell Operating Companies have 
responded by marketing alternative systems, including Centrex and the Datakit Virtual Cir-
cuit Switch. 
25. Examples are encryption, scrambling, forwarding and storage of messages, elec-
tronic mail, telephone and other directories, trade and industry information, news, sports, 
weather information, teleshopping for goods and services, teletranslation, telesoftware, 
teledictation, medical consultation, telediagnosis, tax consultation, expert reports, data 
banks of all sorts, bookkeeping, training and education, telemetry, teleprocessing, and 
telecontrol services. V ANs typically fill a niche between the small data communication user 
who can get by with simple, dial-up analog telephone lines and the large corporate or other 
enterprise user that requires its own fully dedicated lines. 
10
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munications Inc.26 and determined that market entry for packet 
switching should be allowed even though that entry might radically 
change market structure for enhanced, i.e., value-added, services. 
Packet switching is the method by which most VANs transmit 
their data. The process begins when messages are broken into dis-
crete, one hundred character units, or packets, that also carry 
codes for packet routing, sequence and error correction. Thereby 
packets can carry messages of different users that are intermixed 
when transmitted over a single line. Packet assemblers and disas-
semblers are an adjunct of a digital switch, and protocols specify 
how the packet must be constructed. Many communication uses 
involve bursts of information between a remote terminal and a 
mainline computer. Ordinary communication lines can lie idle for 
short periods between bursts. A packet network exploits this un-
used capacity by constantly filling the transmission line with pack-
ets from many sources. 
Packet switching introduced new and improved means for 
meeting consumers' data transmission requirements and did so in 
a way then not available from any other carrier. Two of Packet 
Switching's main advantages are a much higher rate of error detec-
tion and correction than other technologies, a boon to data trans-
mission, and a capacity to divide transmission time into minute 
quantities which can be profitably resold wherever a differential 
exists between prices for high and low-traffic users. Additionally, 
packet switches are constantly becoming more rapid, from a previ-
ous fifteen-hundred packets per second to five thousand packets 
per second, to an expected sixty thousand with parallel processing. 
The FCC further stimulated VAN competition by its 1976 de-
cision requiring all common carriers to abolish their internal regu-
lations which banned or inhibited the unlimited resale and sharing 
of common carrier leased, flat-rate private line facilities and ser-
vices.27 Now independent VAN owners can purchase the unused 
26. Packet Communications Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922 (1973). Packet switching originated 
in research done for the Pentagon by the Boston BBN firm (Bolt, Beranek and Newman), 
which resulted in "Arpanet" linking researchers nationwide and the currently-available 
commercial spin-off, Telenet. 
27. Resale and Shared Use, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), amended on reh'g, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 
(1977), aff'd sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 875 (1978). Common carriers traditionally have dampened competition by restricting or 
prohibiting resale or sharing of private line facilities and services (to avoid "cream skim-
ming," see infra note 102) but exempting certain favored customers. At the time of the 
decision, AT&T prohibited resale and sharing generally, but voluntarily permitted Western 
Electric to resell and certain other groups to share AT&T services. American Tel. & Tel., 
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portions of a third party's leased private line at a cheaper rate 
than the service initially could have been purchased from the com-
mon carrier. Competition from reselling and sharing of leased lines 
at flat rates tends to produce benefits such as lower prices for basic 
and other communication services more closely related to costs, 
avoidance of unused capacity, better management of the network, 
and the creation, by research and development, of ancillary en-
hanced services using basic communication lines. Entities that re-
sell basic communications services are common carriers under the 
1934 Communications Act. 
C. The Divestment of AT&T 
Initially, AT&T was slow to embrace the FCC's new competi-
tive policies. Apparently, this stance, plus additional AT&T prac-
tices, led to an antitrust suit in 197 4. In the eyes of the United 
States Department of Justice, AT&T was attempting to monopo-
lize a broad variety of telecommunication services and equipment 
markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. These 
violations included unreasonably exerting control over the Bell Op-
erating Companies (BOCs) to prevent or substantially impair in-
terconnections which the SCCs, such as MCI, needed to serve their 
local customers. This activity unreasonably created a severe, struc-
tural "bottleneck" to competition in the unregulated intercity tele-
communications market, and also restrained competition in unreg-
ulated telecommunications equipment markets.28 After a trial on 
the merits had been nearly completed, AT&T and the United 
States Department of Justice in 1982 surprisingly chose not to go 
to judgment but settled their antitrust case in an unusual way. The 
197 4 case was dismissed and the parties agreed to a Modification 
572 F.2d at 20. 
28. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 n.18 (D.D.C. 1982), 
aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). This situation is 
important for world developments. Companies sometimes use "bottlenecks" aggressively, 
even when it is not economically optimal to do so, to block competition and to develop a 
reputation for being a "tough" competitor, thereby deterring entry by prospective competi-
tor. "Predators" must have a monopoly segment to rely on for this purpose. See J. WENDERS, 
THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1987); 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITU-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM (1986); Kreps and Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 
J. EcoN. THEORY 253 (1982). In Europe, Japan and elsewhere in the world where a govern-
mentally-owned monopoly controls large segments of the market during a transition time of 
turning away from monopoly to market-entry competition, the ability and incentive for 
predatory action is quite real indeed, requiring strict regulation of the former governmen-
tally-owned monopoly. 
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of Final Judgment (MFJ), which became effective in 1984. Techni-
cally, this modification is an amendment to AT&T's previous 1956 
Antitrust Consent Decree. 29 
The new decree solved the anticompetitive "bottleneck" prob-
lem by requiring AT&T to divest itself of all of its local-exchange 
service companies (twenty-two BOCs) and equipment. This act re-
moved more than sixty percent of AT&T's assets plus fifty percent 
of its revenue and eliminated a crucial segment of AT&T's vertical 
integration. The MF J also ended AT&T's ability to require BOCs 
to pay inflated prices for equipment manufactured by AT&T's 
Western Electric, costs the BOCs recovered by charging higher 
government regulated prices to their local customers. 
Currently, the twenty-two BOCs are owned by seven Bell Re-
gional Holding Companies (RHCs). The Consent Decree created 
one hundred sixty-four Local Access and Transport Areas 
(LATAs) in the United States. Each Local Exchange Carrier 
(LEC)-there are more than one thousand independents plus the 
BOCs-is assigned and confined to one or more LATAs. BOCs di-
rectly off er Local Exchange Service, MTS or WA TS toll service, 
Exchange Access service, Private Line service and Central Office 
Based Services; e.g., Custom Calling, Centron, and Gateway Infor-
mation Transmission service. None of these generates or changes 
the information transmitted, and therefore, is not a value-added 
service. BOCs are not permitted to offer "enhanced" services ex-
cept through a structurally separate subsidiary and then only with 
prior court approval under the MF J. This restriction is expected to 
be lifted soon. They are prohibited from offering long-distance or 
internatio~al service. Furthermore, AT&T cannot provide local 
service. 
AT&T kept Bell Labs, its FCC-regulated Long Lines Division 
(now renamed AT&T Communications), AT&T Information Ser-
vices, a newly created entity whose purpose is to provide state of 
the art enhanced telecommunications services and AT&T Technol-
ogies, formerly Wes tern Electric. Except for electronic publishing, 
which is in its infancy and does not yet have a sound competitive 
market and could easily become wholly dominated by AT&T if it 
were allowed to compete before August 1989, the MF J lifted all of 
the previous 1956 court bans on AT&T participation in data 
29. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. 1984), modifying 
United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civ. No. 17-49 (D.N.J. 1956); see supra nott 12. The 
initial decision is reported in United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
13
Morris: Germany's New Telecommincation Law
Published by SURFACE, 1989
78 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:65 
processing, computer, computer-related and information markets. 
Essentially, the new AT&T is a regulated trunk line common car-
rier offering the basic network service of transmitting communica-
tions between and among local and international exchanges and a 
potential and very potent competitor in all unregulated enhanced 
service markets. For the first time since the turn of the century, 
AT&T faces significant competition.30 As the industry leader in the 
United States today, "AT&T has about seventy percent of the 
long-distance market [down from ninety-seven percent], followed 
by MCI with about twelve percent, and Sprint with eight percent," 
and the "rest is spread among smaller long-distance companies 
that serve specific regions. "31 
D. The FCC's Development of a More Competitive Value-
Added Market: Eliminating Cross-Subsidization 
Before the AT&T Consent Decree was agreed upon, the FCC 
in 1981 announced its decision in its Second Computer Inquiry, 
Computer II. 32 Its twofold purpose was to stimulate competition 
and to further the development of all kinds of enhanced telecom-
munications services, especially VANs. To achieve these ends, the 
FCC developed a formal distinction between "basic" network ser-
vices, i.e., essentially the pure, direct technological transmission of 
customer-supplied information, voice or data, without any pre-re-
ceipt modification by the receiver (basically direct telephone and 
telex), and "enhanced" (value-added) services, which largely con-
sist of software driven services plus a switch transmitted over a 
network's lines. The FCC stated that these are essentially "any of-
fering over the telecommunication network that is more than a ba-
sic transmission service." Specifically included are all "services, of-
fered over common carrier transmission facilities ... which employ 
computer processing applications that act on the format, content, 
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted in-
formation; provide the subscriber additional, different or restruc-
tured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored in-
formation." The FCC determined that the burgeoning competition 
30. "AT&T now faces substantial comp4tition from other long distance providers. At 
year end 1987, there were as many as 540 long distance competitors-mostly resellers." 
TELECOM-2000, supra note 2, at 234. 
31. Int'l Herald Tribune, June 12, 1989, at 17. 
32. See Amendment of Section 64.702(a) of the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
(Computer II); 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1988). The additional quotations in the text are from 
these sources. 
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in enhanced service markets was crucial and expected it to become 
robust. Also, competition, not regulation, would serve the public's 
best interest. The FCC, therefore, eschewed all direct regulation of 
the enhanced, value-added services markets, classifying them as a 
non-regulated activity and allowing full, free market entry. Yet, 
problems of VAN market domination and cross-subsidization con-
tinued to exist because the BOCs and AT&T were very strong and 
well capitalized. They still had, and currently have, excellent tech-
nical personnel and management skill. Turned loose, they could 
have competed most effectively in, and probably dominated, the 
emerging "enhanced" services markets. Added to this is the ever 
present problem of cross-subsidization. 
AT&T or BOC competitors, i.e., the other enhanced service 
providers, must pay a fee to transmit their enhanced services to 
customers over lines leased from AT&T or a BOC. It remains to be 
seen if AT&T or a BOC must charge itself the same fee for trans-
mission of their VANs, and if so, is such a fee a genuine economic 
cost or is it merely an economically meaningless accounting entry 
since AT&T and BOCs have excess line capacity and pricing in 
enhanced service markets is unregulated. Also, in such a situation, 
it would be in AT&T's or a BOC's interest to push as many com-
petitive value-added market costs back into its regulated market 
activity. The company would then be assured of governmentally 
regulated compensation to cover them. The pushed-back costs 
would not figure into the price of its enhanced service, which 
would then be cross-subsidized and become very competitive in-
deed. Moreover, the BOCs and AT&T seem to be in an unfair 
competitive position in the enhanced, value-added markets. They 
are able to fix trunk line technical standards that could favor their 
enhanced service offerings, cross-subsidize their competitive activi-
ties in fledgling enhanced service markets by pushing competitive 
costs into regulated areas and draw upon technical personnel, man-
agement, marketing expertise, and finance capital from their regu-
lated basic trunk line services area. 33 "The heart of the cross-sub-
sidy issue," a former Chair of the FCC has declared, "is found in 
the co-existence of monopoly and competitive markets."34 
33. Generally considered, a price structure is subsidy-free if no good or service, or com-
bination of goods and services, can be provided separately and more cheaply. For discussion, 
see Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 966 
(1975). 
34. R. WILEY, COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 48 (reprinted in E. MESTMACKER, KoMMUNIKATION 0HNE MONOPOLE (1980)) 
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Seeking to enable easy identification and prohibition of cross-
subsidization, the FCC ruled that, while AT&T and the BOCs 
would be permitted to compete in the enhanced services markets, 
they could do so only through structurally separate corporations. 36 
An undesirable consequence of the FCC's ruling was that it re-
moved AT&T and BOC's economies of scope.36 Thus, their com-
petitive ability to lower costs and prices of enhanced services to 
ultimate consumers was reduced, even though a very fine line may 
sometimes separate economies of scope from cross-subsidization. 
Additionally, as time passed and stronger competition took hold, 
neither AT&T nor a BOC was seen as so easily capable of domi-
nating the enhanced services markets. But the dangers of cross-
subsidization persisted, and AT&T and the BOCs retained their 
ability to fix their own technical standards in ways that could jeop-
ardize competing enhanced service providers using the network. 
Similarly, AT&T and the BOCs possess other aspects of monopoly 
power from which AT&T's competitors must be protected. The 
FCC could not simply do away with the structurally separate cor-
poration and thereby permit AT&T and BOCs to exploit their 
economies of scope. 
In response to this problem, in August, 1985, the FCC initi-
ated another inquiry into the area, Computer 111.37 The next year, 
35. See Amendment of Section 64. 702 of the Commissions Rules and Regulations 
(Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980); 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), atf'd 
sub nom. CCIA v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The BOCs also need prior court 
approval under the MF J to offer specific enhanced services. See 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCHJ iii! 
73, 118 (a restriction that is soon expected to be lifted). 
36. In a multiproduct or multiservice area, certain synergies or complements of the pro-
duction process may exist, called economies of scope, that can result in a single firm being 
able to produce an entire line of variously related products or services more cheaply than 
can several single firms each specialized to producing only one, or very few, of the total 
products or services produced by the multiproduct or multiservice firm. The case of joint 
production, where one output or service is necessarily related to another, is a familiar spe-
cial case of economies of scope, and an example of it is the production of meat and hides or 
cottonseed oil and cotton. In telecommunications, for example, economies of scope in pro-
ducing enhanced ("value-added") services may exist in the shared use of transmission lines, 
switches and equipment, which are used to supply basic services, the technical "know-how" 
from basic services for constructing enhanced value-added service networks, and the mar-
keting of enhanced services by adding them to that used in basic services. For discussion of 
the conceptual and empirical aspects of estimating economies of scope, see generally Pulley 
& Braunstein, Scope and Scale Augmenting Technological Change: An Application in the 
Information Sector, 5 INFO. RES. & RESUME REP. 105-18 (reprinted in COMMUNICATION AND 
INFORMATION ECONOMICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES (M. Jussawalla & H. Ebenfield ed. 1984)); 
Baumol & Braunstein, Empirical Study of Scale Economics and Production Complemen-
tarity: The Case of Journal Publication, 85 J . PoL. EcoN. 1037 (1977). 
37. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Com-
16
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/4
1989] Germany's Telecommunication Law 81 
the FCC announced its decision and also indicated that yet an-
other inquiry, Computer IV, would be necessary to fully resolve 
matters. 38 In Computer III, the FCC basically reaffirmed its dis-
tinction between "basic" and "enhanced" services, but it elimi-
nated the requirement that AT&T and BOCs compete in enhanced 
service markets only through unregulated and structurally separate 
corporations. The Commission essentially concluded that struc-
tural separation requirements for enhanced services decreased effi-
ciency and innovation. These costs outweighed their benefits in 
limiting AT&T to engage in anticompetitive behavior. Nonstruc-
tural safeguards can effectively preclude anticompetitive behavior 
and improper cost shifting to regulated services. The next step was 
crucial. 
The FCC shifted its regulatory policy from structurally sepa-
rate protections against cross-subsidization and dominant carrier 
abuse of markets to non-structural safeguards. Particularly, the 
FCC required Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI), an 
equal access legal standard, and suggested that a proper Open Net-
work Architecture (ONA) could be the "technological implementa-
tion of CEI. "39 CEI was substituted, in effect, for the structurally 
separate corporation requirement. CEI and ONA are important be-
cause they occur at a time when United States dominant carriers 
are building nationwide fiber-optic, fully Integrated Systems Digi-
tal Networks (ISDNs) and even more powerful Integrated Broad .. 
band Networks (IBNs). Without CEI and ONA, ISDNs can lead to 
greater technological standardization and integration. This innova-
tion carries the danger, especially because of new switch technol-
ogy, of being developed in ways that might decisively favor domi-
nant carriers, or certain other suppliers, in value-added and other 
competitive markets. 
CEl's basic requirement is that AT&T and BOCs afford their 
enhanced services competitors a hook-up to an AT&T or BOC 
puter III, Docket No. 85-229, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. 85-397 (Aug. 16, 1985). 
38. Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 655 (1985); Memorandum, Opinion and Order on 
Reconsideration, Common Carrier Docket No. 85-229 (May 22, 1987) [hereinafter Computer 
III] . 
39. Id. ii 211. Earlier at ii 148, the Commission observed: 
The structural separation requirements sought to achieve this goal [nondiscrimina-
tion] by physically and organizationally separating the carrier's enhanced services 
subsidiary from its basic operations . . . . [A] byproduct of this arrangement was the 
foreclosure of possible efficiencies from integrating enhanced and basic operations. 
In adopting an equal access standard for CEI while removing structural separation, 
we will best preserve our nondiscriminatory policies while promoting efficiency. 
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trunk line network that is similar to the hook-up that AT&T or a 
BOC provides itself for its enhanced or value-added service offer-
ings in competitive markets. CEI is a doctrinal, legal standard 
adopted by the FCC in Computer III. A properly unbundled ONA 
would be its technical implementation. Because ISDN consolidates 
and integrates, it raises market entry barriers to prospective com-
petitors. For example, the ISDN construct will confront an AT&T 
or BOC value-added competitor with an ISDN service greater and 
more expensive than needed; yet, the competitor must purchase 
that whole amount of transmission service, raising his costs and 
prices, in order to hook-up to the ISDN. ONA can eliminate those 
barriers by unbundling the ISDN. This makes its components 
available for use, and reduces market entry barriers. CEI and ONA 
reach into the very center of a network and open it up for use by 
all competitors in the value-added, enhanced services markets. 
This lowers barriers to entry for new rival services and maintains 
fair conditions for market competition while simultaneously per-
mitting AT&T and the BOCs to exploit their economies of scope. 
Basically, ONA is a framework that disaggregates a network 
("unbundling"). It is grounded on the fact that all of a network's 
central office exchange functions that connect communication links 
can be built by using various combinations of building blocks, "Ba-
sic Service Elements" (BSEs). The BSEs can be unbundled and 
ma4e available as separate units to VAN operators. Different 
value-added, enhanced service providers require different BSEs, or 
different configurations of BSEs, that can be sequenced in various 
ways by a central routing point. ONA enables value-added, en-
hanced service providers to use only the trunk line network build-
ing blocks of their choice. What remains is the possibility of 
purchasing an expensive set of required components from a sepa-
rate supplier (other resellers-users or third-party service providers) 
and substituting them for, while combining them with, the rest of 
its needed BSEs purchased from the basic network owner. Thus, 
ONA's unbundling of a telecommunication switch's multiple func-
tions itself can allow for a competitive market to develop for the · 
various functions of the exchange switch. 
Rigorously enforced over time, a strict ONA requirement that 
reaches deeply into a basic network will likely produce widely 
available, diverse, almost individually tailored value-added services 
market, future competition in central exchange services, a signifi-
cant possibility of private group networks appearing with local 
transport competition perhaps bypassing part of the public 
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switched system and technological movement towards a distribu-
tive, rather than a centralized, kind of physical architecture of 
public central office exchange functions. Obviously, the success of 
an ONA in producing diverse entrepreneurial opportunities and 
genuine competition in the enhanced services markets is directly 
related to the degree to which the dominant carriers' trunk lines 
are required to be unbundled. The greatest amount of opportunity 
and competition is more likely to ensue when a common carrier's 
trunk lines are unbundled to their maximum feasible technological 
degree. Anything short of maximum technological unbundling will 
probably not produce the greatest entrepreneurial opportunity and 
full, robust competition. 
In addition to requiring CEI in Computer Ill, the FCC re-
quired three additional safeguards: dominant carriers must imple-
ment a separate and detailed cost accounting system that will pre-
vent them from improperly shifting costs to regulated basic 
services from unregulated enhanced services within a carrier,40 ob-
serve disclosure requirements notifying the enhanced services in-
dustry well in advance of any proposed technical or other changes 
in hardware, software or services that may affect the compatibility 
of their enhanced services with the network41 and disclose cus-
tomer proprietary network information (CPNI)., These safeguards 
mean the dominant carriers must deliver their information about 
their customers' use of their basic network services plus all infor-
mation about their customers' networks and services in the en-
hanced services market to all participants in that market so all 
market competitors can compete having the same knowledge.42 
The CEl's legal equal access standard applies to all dominant 
carriers; i.e., to AT&T, the BOCs and other common carriers simi-
lar in scale to BOCs.43 The FCC further ordered that dominant 
carriers file plans complying with CEl's requirement that 
the basic service functions utilized by a carrier-provided enhanced 
service to be available to others on an unbundled basis, with tech-
nical specifications, functional capabilities, and other quality and 
40. Id. 11 223. 
41. Id. 11 252. 
42. Id. 11 261. This information containing analyses of traffic patterns and other cus-
tomer usages can be helpful when enhanced value-added service providers are calculating 
demand for their special services. The FCC addressed user group's concerns about CPNI 
and the possibility of confidentiality in its Computer IV Inquiry into Filing and Review of 
Open Network Architecture Plans, Common Carrier Docket No. 88-2, 11 411. 
43. Computer III, supra note 38, at 11154, applies CEI to AT&T and BOCs, and 1111 61-
65 of the Supplemental Notice to other large common carriers. 
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operational characteristics, such as installation and maintenance 
times, [to be] equal to those provided to the carrier's enhanced 
services.•• 
CEI regulates on a specific service-to-service basis. The FCC also 
recognized that a proper kind of Open Network Architecture tech-
nologically could meet "the CEI goals of preventing discrimination 
and promoting efficiency" and "would permit AT&T and the 
BOCs to offer such [enhanced] services on an unseparated basis 
without the need for the filing and approval of service-specific CEI 
plans."46 The proper kind of ONA would have to be "unbun-
dled,"46 allow for resale and also satisfy all other CEI parameters.47 
44. Id. ii 147, citing n.209 which states: 
We recognize that exact equality, in the sense that the parameters of every installa-
tion of a given type of basic service are precisely identical, ... is unachievable .... 
We require 'equality' ... to mean that variations in the CEI parameters of the basic 
services offered to competing enhanced service providers, should be no greater than 
those of the basic services used by a carrier in conjunction with its enhanced service 
offerings. We will view any systematic differences between a carrier and its competi-
tors in such variations as inconsistent with this equal access standard. 
45. Id. ii 201. At ii 211, the FCC stated: "[e]ssentially, we conclude that in a network 
design that uses properly defined Open Network Architecture principles, a technological im-
plementation of our requirements can replace our service-by-service regulation of carrier 
participation in enhanced service markets." In ii 201, the FCC also required "carriers to 
minimize interconnection costs for other [enhanced service] providers either by adopting a 
collocation policy or by providing the most efficient available means of concentrating traffic, 
such as loop or trunk multiplexing, so long as it does not discriminate either against or 
among other providers in so doing." 
46. Computer Ill, supra note 38, at iii! 214-16 states: 
Unbundling and Resale Requirements 
214. As part of any Open Network Architecture, carriers must provide unbun-
dled basic service 'building blocks' (Basic Service Elements) to others on a tariffed 
basis. Such unbundling is essential to give competing enhanced services providers 
an opportunity to design offerings that utilize network services in a flexible and 
economical manner. In essence, competitors will pay only for those Basic Service 
Elem~mts that they use in providing enhanced services. 
215. To promote the development of economical Basic Service Elements and to 
deter possible discrimination, we require carrier-provided enhanced services to util-
ize Basic Service Elements under the applicable tariffed terms and conditions, in-
cluding rates. Because the carrier's enhanced services operation will obtain Basic 
Service Elements under tariff, customers and competitors will have access to some 
basic cost information for monitoring the prices of the carrier's enhanced services. 
Conversely, each set of basic services that a carrier incorporates into an enhanced 
service offering must be available to the public under tariff as a Basic Service Ele-
ment or as a set of Basic Service Elements. 
216. The identification and availability of Basic Service Elements are key as-
pects of our unbundling requirement. While we require all basic services incorpo-
rated into a carrier's enhanced offering to be available to others as a Basic Service 
Element or Elements, we will not permit carriers to introduce Basic Service Ele-
ments only at the same time or after they introduce enhanced services that utilize 
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The FCC requested common carriers to submit specific designs for 
an ONA that met its requirements and delayed final decision on 
ONA until November 1988, when, in its Fourth Computer Inquiry, 
Computer IV,48 it approved a "common ONA model" that had 
been filed by the BOCs. •9 
those Elements. Instead, we require each carrier subject to the Open Network Ar-
chitecture requirements to develop an initial set of key Basic Service Elements that 
can be used in a wide variety of enhanced services and that will be provided to the 
public upon request. We would expect such a set to contain unbundled basic service 
functions that could be commonly used in the provision of enhanced services to the 
extent technologically feasible. 
47. Id. ~ 218. The CEI parameters are discussed in Section IV.B.l. On November 18, 
1988, the FCC, in its Computer IV Inquiry (Opinion and Order, Common Carrier Docket 
No. 88-2, Phase II, on Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Phase II, 
F.C.C. 88-382, at 24) summarized its adopted CEI requirements in addition to unbundling 
and resale, including CEI requirements pertaining to interface functionality; technical char-
acteristics; installation, maintenance and repair; end-user access; CEI availability; minimiza-
tion of transport costs, recipients of CEI; and CEI pricing. 
48. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Com-
puter IV, Docket No. 88-2, Phase I, Memorandum Opinion and Order Filing and Review of 
Open Network Architecture, F.C.C. 88-381 (adopted November 17, 1988) [hereinafter Com-
puter IV, Phase I]. 
49. See id. ~~ 1, 496, and paragraphs cited therein. A short description of the core of 
the approved ONA model appears at~~ 56, 57: 
56. As a basis for describing the unbundling of basic services proposed in their 
ONA plans, the BOCs, in collaboration with Bellcore, devised a 'common ONA 
model' that represents the functional means through which an ESP [enhanced ser-
vice provider] would interconnect with a BOC's network. As described in the BOCs' 
Report No. 4, the common ONA model is based upon the architecture of the ex-
isting BOC local distribution networks, from which unbundled BSEs and other fea-
tures may be offered to the public. As noted above, the model consists essentially of 
BSAs, BSEs, CNSs, and ANSs. BSAs are the fundamental tariffed switching and 
transport services that allow an ESP to communicate with its customers through 
the BOC network. Under the common ONA model, an ESP and its customers must 
obtain some form of BSA in order to access the network functionalities that an ESP 
needs to offer its specific services. Examples of BSAs include line-side and trunk-
side circuit switched service, line-side and trunk-side packet switched service, and 
various grades of local private line service. 
57. BSEs [basic service elements] are optional unbundled features (such as 
Calling Number Identification) that an ESP may require or find useful in configur-
ing an enhanced service. CNSs [customer network services] are optional unbundled 
basic service features (such as stutter dial tone) that an end user may obtain from a 
carrier in order to access or to receive an enhanced service. Features that the BOCs 
describe as BSEs and CNSs are generally resident in the stored-program-controlled 
switch located in a carrier's end office. Specially written generic software packages 
in the switch make these functionalities available to ESPs and end users. ANSs 
[ancillary network services] are other services that the BOCs say fall outside of the 
ONA construct, but which may be useful to ESPs. ANSs could include enhanced 
services offered by the carrier, such as protocol conversion, or other deregulated, 
non-common carrier services, such as billing and collection. Furthermore, some 
BOCs include a number of regulated, basic services in this category. 
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The approved ONA model fully applies only to the BOCs and 
to other large local exchanges and to common carriers subject to 
CEI, but not fully to AT&T or other interexchange carriers. The 
FCC found "that AT&T's participation in the competitive market 
for interexchange basic services distinguishes it from the BOCs for 
purposes of ONA policies."60 Because the competitive nature of the 
interexchange basic service market provided an important assur-
ance that access to those services will be open to enhanced service 
providers and because much of the basic service information of 
greatest use to enhanced service providers is controlled by local 
exchange carriers (BOCs) that deal directly with the ultimate user 
and not by interexchange carriers like AT&T, the FCC ruled that 
AT&T is not fully required to implement the type of BOC un-
bundling required by the ONA model. Instead, it may rely on its 
filed and modified ONA plan, which the FCC essentially approved 
as meeting CEI's requirements. 61 
E. Summary of United States Development Toward 
Competition 
Telecommunications in the United States has moved signifi-
cantly from being essentially a regulated monopoly to a more ro-
bust competition. The basic network system has become pluralistic 
instead of effectively monolithic, and a federation of subnetworks 
has emerged. Basic trunk line competition exists. However, econo-
mies of scale and scope still exist. Broad-based public networks 
continue, and soon there will be fully Integrated System Digital 
Networks (ISDNs) with powerful Integrated Broadband (IBN) ca-
pability, which clearly carry characteristics of a natural monop-
oly.62 Additionally, reselling of local and long distance basic tele-
BSA& and BSEs used for interstate purposes will be tariffed by the FCC in future 
rulemaking and state tariffing of intrastate use of BSAs and BSEs will be scrutinized "to 
ensure only that they do not undermine fundamental ONA objectives, particularly with re-
spect to preventing anticompetitive or discriminatory effects on ESPs, and that they are 
sufficiently clear and complete to be useful to us and to ESP competitors in determining 
that our requirements are satisfied." Id. ii 283. 
A discussion of the adequacy of this ONA model to produce competition to the fullest 
extent is beyond the scope of this Article. 
50. Summarized in Computer IV, Phase II, F.C.C. 88-382, ii 4. 
51. Id. ii 78. 
52. 
It should be clear that development and deployments of integrated broadband net-
works will put traditional institutional relationships and arrangements under enor-
mous pressure. The question for policymakers is how to promote the public interest 
by permitting new institutional arrangements to develop that will result in the best 
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communications service is widespread, and private line networks 
have been created primarily by large volume users of voice and 
data transmission. For example, New York's major brokers have a 
private line connecting their Manhattan offices directly to interna-
tional satellite links in New Jersey, thereby by-passing the public 
network entirely. Competition exists in enhanced services markets, 
which are characterized by specializations aimed at the satisfaction 
of individualized needs. America's telecommunication system is no 
longer characterized by a solitary uniformity; instead, it is now 
pluralistic. With developments like ONA, it permits different 
groups of users (each group having a common set of needs but each 
group's needs different from others) to operate by using more effi-
cient networks. Competition and diversity in telecommunications 
have taken hold generally. 
Regulatory problems will continue and much remains to be 
done in America. For example, easy, fair access and technological 
interconnections must be vigilantly protected, the adequacy of 
ONA to produce maximum competition must be guaranteed, 
avoidance of cyclical instability and oligopolistic market activity 
must be insured, new methods of redistributing services to all 
Americans will have to be created, a new and correct principle gov-
erning telecommunications carriers as providers of all forms of 
mass media must be generated, and a fair and effective world sys-
tem of interconnecting telecommunication regulations matching 
the global scope of existing networks remains to be generated. But 
on the whole, competitive American telecommunications markets 
are vigorously responding to the demands of the third technologi-
cal revolution. 
II. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC 
The historical development of telecommunications in Europe 
is quite different institutionally because telecommunications tradi-
tionally has been a sovereign branch of government and subject to 
all of the vicissitudes of politics and bureaucracy. Its usual form 
has been some sort of a state-owned monopoly telephone network 
known as the "PTT," because it is linked politically, administra-
technological solutions and deployment of new services. The alternative is to allow 
players to 'game the process'-use the regulatory, policy and political processes to 
thwart potential competitors-resulting in less competition and few, if any, benefits 
for customers-both consumers and content/information service providers. 
R. PEPPER, supra note 21, at ii 125. 
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tively and particularly by subsidies and other ties to the Post and 
Telegraph services. Although changes are in the winds and "liber-
alization" is in the air, most European countries still essentially 
operate through a state-owned national champion more or less 
similar to the AT&T that existed twenty-five years ago in the 
United States.~3 The technological developments available in the 
United States have been equally available in Europe, and some 
originated there, but they have been implemented more slowly, in 
good part because telecommunications has been seen strictly as a 
national political concern. The sluggish PTT monopolies fre-
quently ignored the new technology's potential, focusing narrowly 
on universalizing their range of basic services in their national 
markets and on supporting local equipment producers. One conse-
quence of PTT monopoly is that compared to the United States, 
53. 
The ln1tltutlonal Spectrum In the European 
Telecommunlcatlon1 Market 
(1987) 
Policy Options West Belgium Denmark Great France Nether- Italy Norway Spain Austria 
Germany Britian lands 
Complete State yea yea no1) no yea yea2) no3) yea no yea 
Ownenhip 
Separate no yea yea yea yea yea yea 
Poat- and Giroaervicea 
Separate Regulatory no yea yea no no yea partly 
lnatitutiona 
Separate Subsidiaries no8) no no no yea yea yea yea yea no 2) 
in Competitive Market.a 
Strong Network yea no4)1) 4) no41 yea5) yea 
Monopoly 
Change in Telecom yea yea no no yea yea yea yea yea 
Monopoly envisaged (1988/89) (1988/89) (1988) (1988/89) (1989-90) (1987) (1987/88) 
Distorted taritt:a yea yea yea leaa yea yea yea yea yea yea 
Unrestricted Uae of nol0)12) no111 nolO) nolO) no no no91 
Leased Linea for 
VAS Services 
Extensive CPE Monopoly yes yealO) yea11 no yea yea yealO) yealO) 
Industrial-Policy yea yea yea yea yea yea yea 
Goals in Procurement 
No. of Network 36) 27) 
Operations 
1) Regional - 2) Some private shareholdings envisaged. - 3) ASST owned by the state. · 4) Open for CATV networks. · 5) Private local networks 
poaaible. - 6) BT, Mercury and Hull Telephone. - 7) DGT and TDF. - 8) Beginning activities through DETECON. - 9) Radio Austria a partial 
exception for aome VAS. - 10) Further liberalisation envisaged. - 11) Unrestricted aale at least until 1988 prohibited. - 12) Shared uae poaaible, also 
aome interconnection of public network. 
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATION ORGANIZATIONS 30 (J. Peck & J. Muller eds. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Foreman-Peck]. 
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European prices are from forty to sixty percent higher for switch-
ing equipment and forty percent higher for transmission equip-
ment, not to mention total labor costs. Naturally, these prices 
must in turn be reflected in consumer charges. 64 
Influenced during the 1980s by American developments and a 
free-market philosophy, the United Kingdom was the first to "lib-
eralize" and introduce competition in its telecommunication sec-
tor.55 It privatized its state-owned monopoly, British Telecom 
(BT), by selling off fifty-five percent of BT's shares, yet continued 
to subject it to regulation. In 1984 the United Kingdom allowed a 
trunk line network competitor to BT, Mercury, to enter the mar-
ket with the possibility of more entrants after 1990. The United 
Kingdom created additional competition by authorizing the licens-
ing of private providers of mobile radio, paging, Cable TV and a 
wide variety of V ANs. With the most liberalized institutions and 
widest competition in Europe, the United Kingdom is located at 
one end of the European telecommunications spectrum. 
France, too, has actively restructured her telecommunications 
industry, and has produced an aggressive, high quality system 
which is a model of efficient technostructure. France deliberately 
developed a high-tech electronics industry, and substantially in-
creased government's role in telecommunications. She nationalized 
a huge share of the telecommunications equipment and electric in-
dustries. In essence, France's new system is structurally very much 
like the old AT&T-Bell system: extremely high quality and verti-
cally integrated, ranging from a Research and Development divi-
sion to equipment manufacturing components and a telecommuni-
cations transmission monopoly, all of which are government 
54. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS: PRESSURES AND POLICIES FOR CHANGE 44 (1983). PTTs are powerful participants in 
European politics. 
On the service side, the [European] market is dominated by PTTs, which usually 
have a wide-ranging monopoly. They are large employers, accounting for between 
0.5 to 1. 7 % of total civil employment, and the most important customer of the tele-
communications equipment industry. The four largest operators, British Telecom of 
the U.K., the Bundespost of West Germany, France Telecom, and SIP (together 
with ASST and Italcable) in Italy-earn more than 80% of the telecom revenue of 
the European Community. They determine the agenda for much of the current re-
structuring debate, at the national level and in the international bodies of Comite 
Europeen de Post et Telecommunication (CEPT) and the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU). 
Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, at 24-25. 
55. See id. at 31. For further discussion of developments in Great Britain, see id. at 
257-78; FOREMAN-PECK & MANNING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1988). 
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owned.66 France's nationalization locates her at the opposite end 
from the United Kingdom in Europe's telecommunications 
spectrum. 
Lying between the United Kingdom's liberalization and com-
petition and France's nationalization is the status quo. Chief 
among the status-quo group is the Federal Republic of Germany 
with its excellent, well financed and politically powerful PTT, the 
Deutsche Bundespost (DBP).67 It has a huge budget not subject to 
direct parliamentary control and its labor force makes it the larg-
est employer in Germany. The DBP has a high quality, uniform 
infrastructure and is ably staffed by experienced personnel who are 
seasoned, skilled and effective practitioners of the art of preserving 
and extending the DBP. It is a powerful political force in Ger-
many. The DBP abhors losing its monopoly control over any as-
pect of domestic and international telecommunication, and has 
neither favored others reselling its basic network services nor the 
leasing of private lines at a flat rate. It successfully has found ways 
to encourage consumers to use its high quality, publicly switched 
network, which delivers overwhelmingly uniform, not individual-
ized, services. The DBP has the largest telex system in the world. 
A. The European Common Market Level 
The Institutions of the European Common Market are playing 
an increasingly important role in European telecommunications. 
At the integrated common market level, Europe is inching towards 
greater liberalization. A crucially important push toward commu-
nity-wide competition came in 1985 when the European Court of 
Justice ruled that national, governmentally-owned PTTs were sub-
ject to the competition and antitrust provisions of the EEC's Char-
56. Fpr further detail, see id. at 131-54; NGUYEN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN FRANCE 
(1988). 
57. The Deutsche Bundespost has come to symbolize national merchantilism. Despite 
growing pressure from domestic and international users, other German ministries, the 
United States and the European Community, the Bundespost continues to follow a national 
protectionist policy with regard to equipment, basic telecommunications services and en-
hanced services. The Bundespost stubbornly insists that a subscriber's premises is insepara-
ble from the network. It consistently argues that it must put the good of the customer 
before the good of the manufacturer. All primary instruments (although not all private 
branch exchanges) are supplied to users by the Bundespost to protect the customer and the 
network. The Bundespost once based its policies on three unquestioned assumptions: the 
market for services is essentially static, the Bundespost is more technologically competent to 
judge and serve the needs of its users than the German users and liberalization will inevita-
bly lead to cream skimming and substantial revenue losses. J . ARONSON & P. CowHEY, supra 
note 4, at 179. 
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ter, the Treaty of Rome, at least to the extent that they engaged in 
commercial undertakings such as selling goods and services for 
payment in markets that were otherwise open to competition.68 
A legislative spur to competition occurred two years later 
when the Single European Act was adopted by all national parlia-
ments of the European Community, amending the Treaty of Rome 
for the first time. 69 It established the European Technology Com-
58. Commission v. Italy, 20 March 1985, EuGH. Slg. 873 (885 et seq.) (1985); WuW 229. 
(1986) (British Telecom). This case is seen by the European Commission as one of the cor-
nerstones for achieving competition in Europe's telecommunication industry. 
British Telecom's (BT's) telex tariffs from England to the United States were lower, 
and telephone tariffs were even lower still, than telex or telephone tariffs from the continent 
to the United States. Telespeed, a independent British firm, received Telex messages and 
data from continental senders and then, without interruption because of its special equip-
ment and leased hook-up directly to BT's telephone line, forwarded the messages or data to 
the United States, thereby making Telespeed's value-added service available at a lower cost 
for continental senders and generally faster than their materials could be transmitted by 
BT's Telex or from a Continental Telex. BT had no monopoly over ancillary services such 
as Telespeed's retransmission value-added service and a competitive market existed. On dis-
covering Telespeed's practice, BT refused to permit any further retransmissions by Teles-
peed over its lines and Telespeed complained. 
The European Commission found that BT, a governmental agency at the time, had 
engaged in "abusive," anti-competitive behavior in violation of Article 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome (EC's Charter): "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited within the com-
mon market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." On several grounds 
Italy challenged the validity of the Commission's findings before the European Court of 
Justice and lost on all counts. The Court ruled that Article 86 applied to BT, for "when 
[BT] took action against private message-forwarding agencies, BT was acting not as an offi-
cial [Governmental] body but as an undertaking" because "placing [its] equipment at the 
disposal of private users on payment of a fee amounted by its very nature to a business 
activity .... " Telespeed's "employment of a new apparatus and methods, which accelerated 
the transmission of messages, constituted technical progress in conformity with the public 
interest and could not be regarded as an abuse" and, although Telespeed's activity "un-
doubtedly led to some decrease of revenue for BT," it also increased the number of users of 
BT's facilities and revenues. "[T]aken as a whole, the results therefore, were in no way 
unfavorable to BT." One should be clear that the Court ruled any governmental entity (i.e., 
DBP) will be considered as an "undertaking" within Article 86 whenever its activity is of a 
"business" nature; i.e., it relates to the offering of services or goods for a fee in a market 
otherwise open to competition. In addition to Article 86, competition is protected by Arti-
cles 85 through 90 of the Treaty of Rome. 
59. Single European Act, 2 Bull, EC Annex 1986; EVR 1986, at 179; HER, IA 22. The 
new Article 8a that was added to the Treaty of Rome by this Act reads: 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establish-
ing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 8b, 8c, 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1), 84, 99, 
lOOa and lOOb and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provision of this Treaty. 
Id., reprinted in H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 228 (1988). 
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munity for regional research and technological development, and 
created the strategic vision that by December 31, 1992, Europe's 
borderless, internal common market should be completed. Envis-
aged is a continental free trade area of 325 million consumers, with 
foundations having been laid for improving the environment and 
working conditions, and for creating irreversible progress toward 
European economic and monetary union. 60 The Commission of the 
European Communities issued its Green Paper61 on telecommuni-
cations in June 1987 and, after receiving comments, announced its 
implementation schedule in February 1988.62 Since then, the Euro-
pean Commission has marched steadily towards its 1992 goal of an 
60. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market, 
COM (85) 310 final, June 14, 1985. 
61. Towards a Dynamic European Economy-Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market For Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290, 30 June 
1987. The European Commission proposed that: 
a) by 1990 the CPE market in the European Community should be completely open to 
competition, although probably a transition period beyond that date will be permitted for 
the supply of the first telephone, 
b) from 1989 value-added services, especially those used by business, should be liberal-
ized but there will be no obligation to introduce competition in the supply of basic voice 
traffic, 
c) by 1992 telephone tariffs should be "reasonably" aligned with costs, 
d) competition in CPE throughout the Community should be encouraged by establish-
ing a European Telecommunications Standards Institute for equipment approval, 
e) general principles should be agreed under which companies will have access to leased 
lines, and 
f) in 1989 there should be free competition in the supply of small satellite dishes for 
reception only (i.e., slow data transmission). 
62. Towards a Competitive Community-Wide Telecommunications Market in 
1992-Implementing the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Tele-
communications Services and Equipment-State of Discussions and Proposals by the Com-
mission, COM(88), 9 February 1988. The action deadlines announced were: 
(i) Rapid full opening of the terminal equipment market to competition by 31 Decem-
ber 1990 at the latest. (Formal Directive 88/301/EEC under Article 90 was issued on 16 May 
1988 in line with this schedule, but France and Germany have challenged its legality, and 
the case is before the Court of Justice). 
(ii) Progressive opening of the telecommunications services market to competition from 
1989 onwards, with all services other than voice, telex and data communications to be 
opened by 31 December 1989. 
This will concern in particular all value-added services. Special consideration will apply to 
telex, packet and circuit-switched data services. (The proposed directive has been drafted, 
as has another proposed directive on Open Network Provision (ONP), somewhat similar to 
ONA, which would lay the ground rules for common technical standards, unbundling, mini-
mum services and harmonization principles on which tariffs should be based. Both proposed 
directives are coming under intense pressure from PTTs). 
(iii) Full opening of receive-only antennas as long as they are not connected to the 
public network, by 31 December 1989. Directive 88/301/EEC includes this target. 
(iv) Progressive implementation of the general principle that tariffs should follow over-
all cost-trends. Review of the situation to be achieved by 1 January 1992. 
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open, diverse, competitive and integrated, but flexible, telecommu-
nications system having common high quality technological stan-
dards. It does this primarily through issuing proposed draft laws or 
standards backed up by the threat of issuing Directives to Member 
States, which are subject to court challenge63 and which are largely 
based on the competition requirements of Article 90 of the Treaty 
of Rome. 64 The Directives are mandatory and are seen as a swifter, 
more effective application of Article 90 than case-by-case litiga-
tion.H Directives are limited, however, because they must be cast 
in highly abstract and general language in order to permit their 
application to the EEC's twelve, considerably diverse nations. 
III. GERMANY'S NEW TELECOMMUNICATION LAW AND THE DBP 
Historically, when the German Empire (Second Deutches 
Reich) was founded in 1871, the postal services of the individual 
states were merged and became the national Reichspost. 66 More 
recently, the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP), a PTT, has dominated 
the Federal Republic of Germany's telecommunication industry, 
essentially enjoying a monopoly for all postal and telecommunica-
tions services. Both services were joined under one governmental 
department in 1876 when the Reichspost und Telegraphenverwal-
tung was created and then expanded in 1877 to include tele-
phone-a German PTT was born. The important Law on Telegra-
63. Id. See supra note 58. 
64. Article 90(1) provides that: 
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force 
any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those 
rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94. 
See supra note 58 (art. 86). Article 90(2) provides that: 
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the 
rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as 
the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of 
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be af-
fected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community. 
Article 90(3) provides that "the Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of 
this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Mem-
ber States." Also, see supra note 58 (Article 86 and its relevance to Article 90 and 
directives). 
65. For further discussion of Common Market developments and European Commis-
sion perspectives, see H. UNGERER & N. CosTELLO, supra note 59. 
66. For historical materials presented in this paragraph, I draw on Haid & Miiller, 
Telecommunications in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, 
at 155-80. 
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phy of 1882 established exclusive monopoly rights for telephone . 
and telegraph activities. It was revised by the Telecommunications 
Installation Act (Fernmeldeanlagengesetz) in 1928,67 which is still 
a valid law, having been recently amended by the main subject of 
this article: Germany's new telecommunications law that took ef-
fect on July 1, 1989 (Poststrukturgesetz). 68 The DBP is a 
Sonderuermogen des Bundes, meaning that it has its own indepen-
dent budget, which is not under direct parliamentary control (but 
the budget and DBP's external borrowing must receive the ap-
proval of the Minister of Finance), and accounting practices. No 
regulatory unit exists like the FCC that is charged with the crea-
tion of a body of specific rules governing the DBP, and otherwise 
controlling it on behalf of the public interest, because the German 
dogma is that public enterprises under direct political control are 
part of government, themselves, and need no additional direct reg-
ulation on behalf of the public interest. The DBP is headed by a 
Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), who 
also is a government Cabinet member, and the DBP's employees 
are civil servants. 
Traditionally, the DBP has sought to extend its monopoly to 
new areas. For example, in the International Courier Services 
case69 involving value-added services in the postal area, the DBP 
sought to extend its domestic express delivery service (Datapost) 
over the local delivery of letters by international air couriers, 
thereby restricting all delivery through DBP's facilities. However, 
this idea was rebuffed by the European Commission's ruling 
67. Telecommunications Installation Act (Fernmeldeanlagengesetz) [hereinafter FAG]. 
68. Gesetz zur Neustruktierung des Post und Fernmeldewesens und der Deutschen 
Bundespost (Poststrukturgesetz) adopted by the German Parliament during its 137th sit-
ting, 20 April 1989, Bundestagdrucksache 11/2854, [hereinafter Poststrukt G]. Actually the 
Postrukturgesetz includes both the Postverfassungsgesetz [hereinafter PostVerfG], which is 
the new Deutsche Bundespost Constitution Act, and the FAG, see FAG, supra note 67, 
which is the newly amended Telecommunication Installation Act, dating from 1928. See 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
The new law has two goals: 
The promotion of competition in the telecommunications markets by introducing 
new regulatory conditions, and a restructuring of the Deutsche Bundespost by sepa-
rating the sovereign from the entrepreneurial tasks and by implementing a market-
oriented business organization to insure that it can fulfill its infrastructural obliga-
tions and improve its performance in competitive markets. 
Federal Government Cabinet, Substantiation of the Draft Law Concerning the Restructur-
ing of Posts and Telecommunications and of the Deutsche Bundespost 4 (Passed by the 
Federal Government's Cabinet, May 11, 1988) [hereinafter Substantiation]. 
69. See 1 Bull. E.C. (1985), point 2.1.10 (West Germany); 12 Bull. E.C. (1985), point 
2.1.79 (France); WuW 381 (1985). 
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against DBP that its requirement was an abuse of its power under 
the competition rules embodied in Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.70 
In the Cordless Telephone case,71 the DBP sought to receive from 
the German government by law the exclusive right to supply al-
most all equipment connected to the DBP's public telephone net-
work, including cordless phones (CPE), but not private automatic 
branch exchanges (PABXs). The European Commission deter-
mined that DBP's desired law would create a new partial monop-
oly, i.e., the scope of the exclusive right-to-supply, and it would 
destroy user free choice of network-compatible terminal equipment 
supplied by other Member States. It was, therefore, invalid under 
the second subparagraph of Article 37(1) of the EEC Treaty. Fi-
nally, in the Modem case,72 the DBP, under yet another proposed 
German law, claimed the exclusive right to supply all modems that 
were connected to the DBP's public telephone network. Again the 
DBP was rebuffed by the European Commission's rulings which 
stated that such monopoly extension fell under Article 37(1), simi-
lar to the Cordless Telephone case and that tying the purchase of 
DBP's modems to obtaining access to telephone network services 
was an abuse of the DBP's dominant position as network operator 
contrary to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty,73 similar to the Interna-
tional Courier Services case. 
A. The German Constitution 
Germany's 1949 Constitution provides in one article that the 
postal service, which is interpreted to include telecommunications, 
shall be conducted as matters of direct federal administration with 
their own administrative substructures,74 and that the German na-
70. For Article 86 and its interpretation, see supra note 58. 
71. See 3 Bull. E.C. (1985), point 2.1.43; 2 C.M.L. Rep. 397 (1985). This case was de-
cided under Article 37(1). The first sentence provides that Member States must "adjust any 
State monopolies of a commercial character so as to ensure that . . . no discrimination re-
garding the conditions under which goods are procured or marketed exists between nation-
als of Member States," and the second part applies the first sentence "to anybody through 
which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines 
or appreciably influences imports or exports between Member States," and "to monopolies 
delegated by the State to others." 
72. EC 718 (1986), point 2.1.85. 
73. For Articles 37(1) and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, see supra notes 58, 71. 
74. Basic Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (GRUNDGESETZ) GG 
art. 87 (W. Ger.). The Basic Law does not specify which institutions should render postal 
and telecommunication services nor how these institutions must be organized or whether 
they must be public or private. Presumably therefore, the German parliament, within a 
broad scope of reason, can resolve these matters by legislation. 
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tional government shall have exclusive power to legislate regarding 
postal and telecommunications services,71~ thereby excluding Ger-
many's states and local governments from the field. The Constitu-
tion could be variously interpreted. The DBP's interpretation, with 
apparent acquiescence from the German parliament, holds that 
Germany's Constitutional PTT obligations cannot be discharged 
by completely privatizing the DBP and by government exercising 
only a regulatory role over competing, private common carriers in-
cluding a privately owned DBP (the American and British solu-
tions); instead, the government's sovereign obligations require the 
existence of a state-owned enterprise (DBP) as part of German 
government. It further claims that DBP must be authorized to pro-
vide the full range of telecommunication services. This view does 
not require an exclusive state monopoly over every aspect of tele-
communications; thus, this interpretation does not exclude the 
possibility of competition for the DBP, and Germany's new law en-
dorses competition in certain areas while retaining monopoly . in 
others. This Constitutional interpretation has not gone 
unquestioned. 76 
B. The New Law's Revision of DBP's Organizational Structure 
One of the major goals of the new German law is to promote 
competition in certain telecommunications markets by introducing 
new regulatory conditions instituting circumscribed areas of com-
petition where previously there was monopoly. This goal required 
the DBP to be restructured. 
The new law first seeks, at least in part, to separate the sover-
75. Id. art. 73(7). The terms "post" and "telecommunications" are not defined, and 
according to the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 12, 205; 46, 120) the terms are not 
tied to the meaning they had when Germany's Constitution took effect, but are dynamic 
and future oriented, open to a modern interpretation and thereby capable of including all 
aspects of modern telecommunications. In two cases, Germany's constitutional court has 
ruled that the federal government's authority to legislate on telecommunications includes all 
aspects of a transmissions technical and structural functions, but not the substantive con-
tents of transmitted information. See BVerfGE 12, 205, 225 ff. and BVerfGE, 12, 205, 226 ff. 
76. See, e.g., A. HESSE, DIE VERFASSUNGSMASSIGKEIT DES FERNMELDEMONOPOLS DER 
DEUTSCHEN BUNDESPOST (1984), and the dissenters in the Report submitted by E. Witte 
(Chair) in Gov'T COMM'N FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS, RESTRUCTURING OF THE TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS SYSTEM (1988) (Although not followed in all its recommendations, this report is the 
foundation for much of Germany's new telecommunications law). Moreover, claims have 
been made that the DBP's exclusive monopoly of services is unconstitutional under the 
Constitution's article 12 guarantee: "All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their 
occupation, place of work and place of training. The practice of an occupation may be regu-
lated by legislation." See also BVerfGE II, at 168. 
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eign and political part of telecommunications; i.e., the governmen-
tal function from the DBP's entrepreneurial and business func-
tions, and thereby create an independent, market-oriented, 
business-like DBP that simultaneously continues to be legally 
charged with fulfilling its monopoly infrastructural tasks and is 
also expected to be capable of vigorously participating in competi-
tive markets. Thus, the DBP will have an even greater ambivalent ' 
institutional character. It will continue to be a financially indepen-
dent institution, dependent upon earning revenues by competing 
in competitive markets and through its governmentally guaranteed 
monopoly tariffs. The DBP will be expected to be an independent-
minded, competitive enterprise while simultaneously continuing to 
be dependent upon political will, especially over its monopoly and 
additional "infrastructure obligations." This means that govern-
ment clearly will be its monopoly regulator, and, as set forth below, 
government may at times also control or participate in DBP's com-
petitive market entrepreneurial decisions because the monopoly 
side of the DBP remains significantly interconnected to its com-
petitive side. The new law retains the unity of DBP as an entity, 
and reorganizes the DBP's three existing services into three quite 
distinct but interlinked and interdependent enterprises: Postdienst 
(postal service), Postbank (postal bank) and Telekom.77 Each en-
terprise has its own business Management and Supervisory 
Board,78 and is to be managed in accordance with the principles of 
governmental administration and business management applicable 
to its various aspects. 
1. Telekom's Management Board 
Telekom's Management Board is intended to be a highly 
skilled professional entity with full-time Board members. The 
Board's appointees are subject to review and can serve for renewa-
ble five year terms. They "should be outstanding experts in busi-
ness management," and must be "German" within the meaning of 
77. PostVerfG, supra note 68, at§ 1(2). Each separate enterprise can sue or be sued in 
its own name, but cannot sue another DBP enterprise, id. § 5, and is represented in or out 
of court by its Management Board unless otherwise specified by Board rules, id. § 15(3). 
However, only the Board of Directors of the DBP can represent the entire DBP in or out of 
court. Id . § 6. A form of cross-subsidization is legally mandated: "In carrying out their tasks, 
the enterprises shall be obliged to make use of the services provided by the other Deutsche 
Bundespost enterprises to the extent necessary to satisfy their needs, [however,] the princi-
ples of economic efficiency shall be taken into account in this connection." Id. § 4(2). 
78. Id. § 3(2). 
33
Morris: Germany's New Telecommincation Law
Published by SURFACE, 1989
98 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:65 
Article 116 of the Constitution. They are expected to work on a 
collegial basis, with the Board consisting of a Chair plus additional 
members, the number of which is determined later by the Federal 
Government's Cabinet after recommendations by the Minister of 
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), who also must approve 
each person appointed and separately determine each Board mem-
ber's salary, retirement and other benefits.79 No Board member 
can receive payment from any other source for services rendered 
and one member must be made specifically responsible for person-
nel and welfare matters. 80 Telekom's Management Board, with 
MPT approval, can employ salaried staff,81 and has the fundamen-
tal entrepreneurial function. For example, it "runs" the entire en-
terprise, all monopoly and competitive aspects, by a majority vote, 
entrusting its affairs to an executive committee called the General 
Directorate.82 The Management Board must exercise "due care," 
and shares business management affairs with its Supervisory 
Board, to which it is required to report and respond to it. It also 
must submit all tariffs for mandatory services for approval to the 
MPT.83 One of the Board's charges is to operate in accordance 
with business principles, and the obvious goal for Telekom, as well 
79. Id. §§ 12(1)-12(5). Under § 13, Board Members are formally appointed and dis-
missed by the Federal President on recommendation of the Cabinet, and the MPT and the 
Supervisory Board agree on who shall be Chair of the Board; if they cannot agree, the Fed-
eral Government's Cabinet.decides who shall be Chair. The basic principles of business en-
terprise governing management of DBP's Telekom are found in § 4. 
80. Id. §§ 12(2), 12(4). Rather clearly, the DBP's union will be interested in this posi-
tion as its administrators who can serve on the Board will be interested in positions on the 
management board. However, Board members must not occupy another salaried position or 
carry on a trade or profession in addition to their official function, and cannot be a manage-
ment member of any other business enterprise, be a legislator or member of the executive 
branch, or give expert advice or opinions for pay. Presumably, they can receive gratuities 
and gifts. Under § 14, civil servants (DBP's personnel, Federal judges and military person-
nel) can be Board members but must go on leave of absence during the period; however, 
most of their civil servant benefits continue to accrue. 
81. Id. § 47(2). 
82. This is undefined in the law. See id. §§ 1, 15. It is the highest administrative au-
thority and a supreme federal authority in terms of civil service law. See also id. § 40(3). 
83. Id. § 15. Infrastructural or mandatory services are those services that must be ren-
dered by the DBP's enterprises in the public interest, particularly on account of their obli-
gation to make services and facilities available to the general public. The Federal Govern-
ment Cabinet can ultimately determine the basic structure of the mandatory services and 
fix the tariffs payable for them. See id. § 25(2). Before the Management Board finally de-
cides matters it must solicit the opinion of the Supervisory Board, which has two months to 
render it. Such matters include introducing new or major alterations in or abandonment of 
existing service branches, introducing fundamental technical innovations, determining prin-
ciples for investing credit balances, setting tariffs for mandatory services that are important 
for future economic development of Telekom and drafting the annual report. Id. § 23(5). 
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as the other two DBP's enterprises, is to earn revenues from com-
petitive markets and monopoly services sufficient to cover all costs 
plus a profit for future, self-financing expansion and development. 
2. Telekom's Supervisory Board 
Telekom's Supervisory Board seeks balanced interest group 
representation, and consists of twenty-one members who may not 
serve on any other Supervisory Board, who select their chair and 
deputy chair, whose meetings, which are not open to the public, 
must occur at least once every three months and who can receive 
renewable five-year appointments from, and be removed for cause 
by, the Federal Government Cabinet.84 Seven Board members are 
independently identified and nominated by the MPT to represent 
the "Bund" as the governmental owner of Telekom, i.e., represent-
ing the interests of the Nation as a whole.86 Seven members are 
nominated by the MPT to represent the interests of Telekom's 
customers, but only after consultation with various associations so 
that trade and industry will have four representatives: one repre-
sents agriculture and the remaining three represent all other con-
sumers.86 The final seven members represent Telekom's personnel 
and are nominated by the MPT after receiving proposals of spe-
cific persons from Telekom's union. At least four nominees must 
come from Telekom's staff. 87 
The primary task of the Supervisory Board is to supervise, 
control and participate in Telekom's management, including decid-
ing with the MPT the appointment and dismissal of Management . 
Board members and nominating its Chair for appointment by the 
Federal President on the recommendation of the Federal Govern-
ment Cabinet.88 The Supervisory Board may make proposals and 
84. Id. §§ 16(1)-(5), 18-21. For Telekom, its first board will see one member's appoint-
ment terminate at the end each of the first three years and two members' appointments end 
at the end of the fourth and fifth year. Id. § 19(5). Board membership expires if a member 
loses the capacity to hold public offices and to acquire rights from public elections. or if 
suspended or dismissed from the civil service or by breach of secrecy. Id. § 19(4). 
85. Id. §§ 16(1), 17(1). Obviously, no one can be sure exactly what the specific, as op-
posed to generalized, interests of the nation as a whole are in each case and it is likely and 
also all too human that the MPT will recommend politicians, whether from his or other 
parties, who are sympathetic to his and his party's substantive views about Telekom and its 
future. 
86. Id. §§ 16(1), 17(2). 
87. Id. §§ 16(1), 17(3). 
88. Id. §§ 13, 23(1). Under § 23 the Supervisory Board is especially charged to insure 
that the management principles found in § 4 are observed. Also under § 13(3), if by a two-
thirds vote or more, the Supervisory Board resolves that one or more members of the Man-
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inqumes to the Management Board, and after the Management 
Board makes a presentation, it must, within two months, pass res-
olutions adopting or altering the Management Board's economic 
plan, or budget, which must be based on business principles, its 
annual financial statement, its tariffs for Telekom's monopoly ser-
vices, its specific rules regarding economic management, the crea-
tion of subsidiaries and purchase or sale of property or economic 
interests and the general rules of procedure governing Telekom. 89 
These are substantial entrepreneurial decisions, carrying far reach-
ing internal and external effects for both the DBP's monopoly and 
its competitive market operations. If the Management Board ob-
jects within one week of receipt of a Supervisory Board resolution, 
and so notifies the Board and the MPT, the Supervisory Board has 
one month in which to reconsider and "substantiate" its resolution. 
If by majority vote the Supervisory Board maintains its previous 
position, then the MPT shall decide the matter after a presenta-
tion by the Management Board. 90 
3. The DBP Continues as a Single Unit 
The continuity of the DBP as a separate entity is maintained 
in several ways. It has a general, overall responsibility for all en-
trepreneurial and operational tasks at the national and interna-
tional level. It also has responsibility for a special DBP fund, 
which marks the limit of the German government's obligation to 
meet all DBP liabilities and which consists of the partial special 
funds generated by each of the DBP's three new enterprises. Thus, 
the three enterprises are made legally answerable for certain of 
each other's liabilities and cross-subsidization is expressly 
mandated. 91 
The Chairs of the three Management Boards constitute the 
Board of Directors of the DBP. They, in turn, elect their chair and 
will make most decisions unanimously. 92 This Board represents the 
agement Board must be dismissed, the MPT is required to submit that resolution to the 
Federal Government Cabinet for action. 
89. Id. § 23(3). See also id. §§ 44(1), 45(4). 
90. Id. § 24(1)-24(3). 
91. Id. §§ 1, 2. The German government is not legally liable beyond their respective 
partial special funds for the liabilities of the DBP's three enterprises. Under § 4, the enter-
prises are required within a broad range of efficiency to make use of each other's services. 
See supra note 77. 
92. PostVerfG, supra note 68, at§ 7. If a unanimous decision cannot be reached within 
one month, the MPT must first be consulted on the matter and then within the next month, 
the decision can be taken by majority vote. 
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DBP as an entity in and out of court, coordinates economic and 
financial management among the three enterprises, determines the 
principles governing the required mutual use of the DBP's services 
and its special fund, and handles all of the DBP's welfare 
matters.93 
4. The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications 
The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) sets 
the overall direction in policy and serves as the link providing sov-
ereign and political supervisory control over all of the DBP and its 
competitive and monopoly aspects. After first hearing Telekom or 
the other DBP enterprises on a matter, the MPT can recommend 
measures to the Federal Government Cabinet, which then can is-
sue ordinances having the force of law. Such measures can govern a 
wide range of subjects, such as a common framework for all aspects 
of rights and duties of all parties involved in all contract forma-
tion, execution, termination and breach, including the nature and 
extent of Telekom's contractual liability, conditions for protecting 
data flows, connecting terminal equipment,9" changes in monopoly 
tariffs and the development of infrastructure that must be ren-
dered in the public interest.9& The MPT must ensure that all en-
terprises of the DBP observe the law and other rules or regulations 
93. Id. §§ 8-11. Under § 9, welfare matters include DBP's employees uniform health 
and accident insurance, social security, labor protection, protections for working mothers 
and minors and other welfare matters, the costs of which are allocated proportionately to 
each enterprise. Individually, the enterprises also can sue and be sued. See supra note 77. 
94. PostVerfG, supra note 68, at § 30. 
95. Id. § 25(2). A suggestion that new tariffs or new infrastructural services (mandatory 
services) be developed can originate in the Management Board, id. § 15, or Supervisory 
Board, id. §§ 23(1), 23(4), the MPT, id. § 25, or the Council on Infrastructural Matters, id. § 
34, but in practice, even if suggested by others, the actual proposal would first be developed 
by Telekom's Management Board and then work its way through the Boards to the MPT 
and ultimately to the Federal Government Cabinet for action. Under § 15(5), the Manage-
ment Board must also submit proposals directly to the MPT for action under §25(2), which 
permits the Federal Government to issue an ordinance requiring certain new infrastructural 
services. 
The Council on Infrastructural Matters, an advisory body to the MPT, consists of 
eleven members each from the German Bundestag (the division of parliament representing 
the people) and the Bundesrat (the division representing the German states); they are not 
bound by any mandates or directions and must comment and resolve on MPT refusals, 
objections, instructions, or proposed resolutions having the force of law, regarding all mat-
ters of importance to the infrastructure or tariffs for it and Telekom's monopoly sector. See 
id. §§ 32-34. If the MPT concludes that he cannot take a certain resolution of the Council 
into effect, he must communicate his reasons in writing to the Council, which must recon-
sider it, but if the Council does not agree with the MPT, then the question goes to the 
Federal Government Cabinet, which must decide the matter within one month. Id. § 35. 
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governing the performance of their duties.96 The new law hesitat-
ingly bows in the direction of separating the MPT's sovereign and 
political controls over DBP from the MPT's controls over DBP's 
and Telekom's managerial and business activity.97 For example, 
the MPT is charged in § 1 with performing only political and sov-
ereign tasks, but the MPT must also approve or deny Supervisory 
Board resolutions on very substantial entrepreneurial or manage-
rial decisionmaking, such as (1) adopting or significantly altering 
Telekom's economic plan (budget), (2) approving its financial 
statement, (3) discharging of Management Board members, (4) 
tariffing Telekom's monopoly services, (5) approving rules regulat-
ing detailed aspects of Telecom's economic management, and (6) 
approving the creation of subsidiaries or purchase or sale of any 
economic interest. An MPT denial, however, can rest only on the 
ground that the resolution conflicts with "the interests of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany" (wholly undefined in the law), or con-
flicts with an applicable German law or regulation. 98 The new law 
also requires the MPT "to determine medium and long-term 
objectives" of Telekom in order to promote its development and to 
safeguard the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, all of 
which seemingly are rather substantial entrepreneurial and mana-
gerial matters. Where he believes it necessary, the MPT may re-
quest "that profitability checks be made. "99 Given that all of the 
MPT's above-described activities either impinge on, or directly in-
volve managerial functions, a serious question exists whether Ger-
96. Id. § 27. 
97. For example, § 1 states that the provision of telecommunication services is incum-
bent upon the MPT and DBP, and then further states that the MPT shall exercise the 
rights of the "Bund," performing "political and sovereign tasks," and the DBP shall, within 
the framework of its public mandate, perform "entrepreneurial and operational tasks." But 
see § 25(1), which requires the MPT, within his obligations under § 1, to determine the 
"medium and long-range objectives" of the three enterprises in order to promote their de-
velopment and safeguard Federal interests. That crucial task normally is considered a busi-
ness or entrepreneurial function. 
98. Id. § 28. In the case of Nos. 1, 2 or 5, identified in the text, the MPT must first 
consult with the Minister of Finance. Id. § 28(3). It is hard to see how that consultation 
requirement can be aimed at ensuring anything other than sound ordinary entrepreneurial 
decisionmaking, thereby involving the MPT in an ordinary business management area. With 
respect to No. 4, the MPT must first consult the Federal Minister of Economics, id. § 28(3), 
which presumably is for the purpose of checking the resolution's compliance with antitrust 
and similar laws, again a seemingly normal entrepreneurial or business management 
function. 
99. Id. § 25(1). The Council for Infrastructural Matters would participate in determin-
ing objectives insofar as the determination of such objectives impinges upon the infrastruc-
ture. See id. § 31, 34(4). 
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many's new law actually meets the requirements of the EEC's 
Green Paper on Telecommunications. It requires a clear separation 
between governmental regulatory and operational functions as "a 
fundamental pre-condition for the establishment of a competitive 
market," for in the EEC's anticipated 1992 common market "the 
telecommunications administrations cannot continue to be both 
regulators and market participants, i.e., both referee and 
player. "100 
C. Three Basic Economic Facts About Telecommunication 
Three facts about European telecommunications, like telecom-
munication facts elsewhere in the world, are well known: a few very 
heavy users of a network (ranging from three to six percent) annu-
ally produce approximately sixty percent of a system's revenue, the 
telephone "service generates eighty to ninety percent of [all] the 
public telecommunications operators' (PTOs) revenues and these 
revenues are needed to finance all the social and political obliga-
tions of PTOs,"101 usually financing universal telephone service at 
a uniform price and cross-subsidizing other activities, especially 
the Post. The huge telecommunication revenues are largely profit, 
usually achieved by selling highly priced monopoly services well 
above their constantly declining costs of production. PTTs jeal-
ously guard their authority to generate telephone service revenues, 
whether from voice or data transmission, and are particularly op-
posed to any arrangement that could lead to their impairment, 
such as dreaded "cream skimming."102 On the other hand, large 
100. Towards a Dynamic European Community-Green Paper on the Development of 
the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290, June 
30, 1987 at 73 [hereinafter Green Paper]. This separation continues to be insisted upon by 
the European Commission. See H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 205-06. 
101. Neumann, Models of Service Competition in Telecommunications 3 (DBP, Re-
search Paper No. 28, August 1987). The large users of telecommunications generally are 
corporate headquaters, multinationals, banks, airlines, insurance firms, some universities, 
engineering and consulting firms, law offices, media organizations, advertisers, health deliv-
ery organizations and other large providers of services. 
102. "The biggest-and under present conditions the only real-threat is the potential 
loss of voice traffic-which currently accounts for 85 to 903 of all telecommunication reve-
nues-by public switched network." H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 207. 
"Cream skimming" presupposes monopoly pricing and is impossible against the most effi-
cient competitor if his prices are marginal cost based. But, of course, marginal cost pricing 
would also eliminate monopoly profits, a result not desired by PTI's. Where prices are not 
cost-based, "cream skimming's" most obvious case occurs where competition is permitted to 
resell basic service, construct and operate competitive networks, or both, as is allowed in the 
United States. See infra text accompanying note 108. Given the fact that three to six per-
cent of a network's heavy users produce nearly sixty percent of a PTI''s revenues and that 
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users of a network constantly seek ways to cut their costs and, 
where permitted, as in the United States, they may bypass the 
public switched service completely.103 
1. Monopoly and Competitive Market Cross-Subsidization 
One important purpose of Germany's new law is cross-subsidi-
zation. The law expressly requires one kind of cross-subsidization 
and permits another. First, the law states that financial cross-sub-
sidization among the three enterprises of DBP "shall" be effected 
if one of the enterprises is unable to defray its expenses from its 
own revenue.10• Secondly, the law provides for cross-subsidization 
PTT monopoly prices are well above costs, new competitors with lower prices can attract 
away the heavy users and their high density routes from a PTT simply by lowering prices 
sufficiently to induce a user to change his network. From the point of view of the PTT, 
there has been no new service created and "cream skimming" has occurred. In time, effec-
tive "cream skimming" competition would push all prices down to a level where they would 
be marginal-cost-based, and assuming equal efficiency among competitors, "cream skim-
ming" would cease, as would the monopoly profits, which the PTTs want. 
"Cream skimming" can also occur when a PTT has a network monopoly but leases a 
private line to A at a reasonable flat rate and permits A to resell its use when not needed by 
A, as is the situation in the United States. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 47. Due 
to economies of scale, the per unit cost of A's leased line, e.g., cost to A per telephone 
minute of usage, will decrease as usage increases. Thus, it is in A's interest to have the line 
used all of the time, thereby reducing A's cost of leasing the line by revenues received for its 
use by others. In some circumstances, this can also be made attractive to others-the heavy 
users-because, due to A's declining average costs, A may be able to provide telephone ser-
vice to others more cheaply than they otherwise could obtain it directly from the PTT. The 
tendency is to work towards cost-based pricing. This is another version of PTT-feared 
"cream skimming." Finally, if a PTT leases lines at a flat rate, the equivalent of "cream 
skimming" can occur, as it does in the United States, whenever a group of heavy users 
combine and lease a line sharing its use up to all of the time for their business needs. PTTs 
seek to eliminate the possibilities of "cream skimming" either by leasing lines only accord-
ing to usage sensitive, not flat rates, prohibiting resale of leased lines, or obtaining a legal 
monopoly over the entire network and the services that can be offered. 
Uniform flat, not usage-sensitive, rates for leasing of lines seem necessary for a vigorous, 
independent development of fair and competitive VAN services. Thus, a severe problem can 
be posed for PTTs that desire to eliminate all possibilities of "cream skimming" by ob-
taining a network and service monopoly and yet desire to provide their country the broadest 
possible range of VAN services, because it is highly unlikely any large PTT will meet all of 
the individually diverse needs of a broad range of consumers in any modern industrial state. 
103. See supra text after note 52; Mansell, The Telecommunications Bypass Threat: 
Real or Imagined?, 20 J. EcoN. IssuEs 145 (1986). 
104. PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 37(3). Historically, substantial telecommunications 
revenues in Germany have been used to subsidize the Post. Dr. Schwarz-Schilling, the cur-
rent MPT, in a press release heralding parliamentary passage of Germany's new law, opti-
mistically predicted "that by the mid-90s it will be possible to achieve an economic situation 
for the Yellow Post that renders the question of financial compensation between 
TELEKOM and the POSTAL SERVICE virtually irrelevant." Pressemitteilung, April 20, 
1989 at 6. 
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within a single enterprise's different services, expressly stating that 
"using revenues from monopoly services for the benefit of competi-
tive services, shall be permissible."1°~ Germany's new law also re-
quires Telekom to maintain and extend a state-of-the-art telecom-
munications infrastructure.106 To insure that Telekom will have 
the ability to achieve all of its telecommunication ends, Telekom is 
expressly given two legal monopolies, one over the physical net-
work itself and the other over the supply of certain services over 
the network. 
D. Telekom's Monopolies 
The new law continues an exclusive monopoly in physical tele-
communication facilities. It grants the exclusive right to Telekom 
to construct and operate all transmission lines including the associ-
ated network terminations, 107 thereby precluding the competition 
in trunk line networks, which is the norm in the United States,108 
the United Kingdom109 and Japan.110 This has been the historical 
105. PostVerfG, supra note 68, §§ 37(2), 37(4). 
106. Id. §§ 4, 15(5), 23(3), 25, 34. 
107. The new law also grants the exclusive right to construct and operate all radio in-
stallations. FAG, supra note 67, § 1(2). After justifying legal monopoly on grounds of avoid-
ing "cream skimming" that could come with network competition and citing economies of 
scale, the Federal Government Cabinet stated: 
The Deutsche Bundespost is to continue to develop new networks and network 
technologies not solely on the basis of profitability considerations. In future, too, 
telecommunication networks are to be set up on a nationwide basis and be accessi-
ble on the same conditions in all regions. Whereas the more or less equal develop-
ment of the infrastructure is conceivable without monopoly, the objective of making 
the transmission network available for use everywhere on equal conditions and at 
equal tariffs ultimately requires the network monopoly to be preserved. 
Reform of the Postal Telecommunications System in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Concept of the Federal Government for Restructuring of the Telecommunications Market, 
MPT, May 1988 at 40-41 [hereinafter Concept]. 
This monopoly over network is most likely acceptable to the European Community. 
The EC's 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications recognizes that "Article 222 [of the 
Treaty of Rome] provides that the Community shall in no way prejudice the system of 
property ownership in Member States. Therefore, the determination of the appropriate 
ownership of telecommunications administrations-in particular whether they should be in 
public or private ownership-fall1 to the Member States." Green Paper, supra note 100, at 
71. 
108. See supra text and accompanying notes 18-23, 28-31. 
109. See supra text and accompanying note 55. 
110. See K. Ems. TELECOMMUNICATION DEREGULATION IN JAPAN (1988) and publications 
by Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication such as OPEN Telecommunications 
Market of Japan (Tokyo, March 1989); White Paper on Communications in Japan (Tokyo, 
1988); Japanese Legislation on Telecommunications: The Telecommunication Business Law 
(Unofficial Translation, Tokyo, Dec. 1984). 
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situation in Germany. 
The MPT can, however, make exceptions for the creation of 
special networks. He may grant self-contained concessions for cer-
tain routes or districts, stipulating their costs and conditions in the 
license, and he must grant licenses on application by public electric 
suppliers or satellite communication installations transmitting at 
low bit rates so long as the operational interests of Telekom are 
safeguarded. m Without requiring application to the MPT, the law 
continues to grant a right to private persons to install and operate 
limited internal networks, similar to American LANs. 112 However, 
the network can not be publicly linked. They can exist only within 
or between an owner's premises, or between premises united to 
form a common undertaking, so long as the linear distance be-
tween premises is not greater than twenty-five kilometers, and 
even then, only if the network's traffic relates strictly to activities 
on the premises.113 None of the exceptions competitively endanger 
Telekom's general network monopoly because they are wholly in-
ternal whether public or private. Not being linked to any of 
Telecom's lines or public switches, they are unable to transmit to 
third parties. 
1. Telekom's Service Monopoly Over Voice Transmission 
The second monopoly the new law grants Telekom is the ex-
clusive right to supply certain services to third parties. Telekom 
has the exclusive right to operate telecommunication facilities for 
the purpose of transmitting "the exchange of speech" of third par-
ties ("Vermittlung von Sprache filr andere dient"). 114 The exact 
111. FAG, supra note 67, § 2(2). The criteria governing the discretionary grant of con-
cessions are not specified; so for guidance, the MPT presumably must refer back to his 
general duties and obligations to preserve and promote the DBP, including Telekom's mo-
nopoly and competitive service areas. See id. §§ 25, 27-31. In the past, licenses have been 
available for mobile radio services, telecommunication services for their own internal use 
and cable TV networks. Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, at 159. Limited to use exclusively for 
their own internal activities, towns, cities, States (including police), dike or sluice or drain-
age corporations, and transport companies are expressly given the right to install and oper-
ate internal telecommunications services by this law without prior MPT approval. FAG, 
supra note 67, § 3(1)-(2). 
112. See supra text discussion accompanying note 24. They can be used to link all of a 
firm's computers together, or to link them to each other and a main frame computer, or to 
link other terminals of a firm, or its computers to other internal terminals, e.g., telex or fax 
machines. 
113. FAG, supra note 67, § 3. 
114. Id. § 1(4). "Jedermann ist berechtigt, Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen filr 
andere ilber Festund Wiihlverbindungen, die von der Deutschen Bundespost TELEKOM 
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scope of this service monopoly grant is not clear. It definitely in-
cludes a huge revenue producer-the exchange of oral human 
speech by telephone. m But does it also include emerging technolo-
gies, such as video telephony, video conferencing,116 or videotex?117 
And does it cover those waiting to be born, such as videotex com-
munication, which is initially delivered orally to computers linked 
bereitgestellt werden, zu erbringen. Dies gilt nicht fur das Betreiben von Fernmelde-
anlagen, soweit es der Vermittlung von Sprache fur andere dient; dieses Recht steht auss-
chliesslich dem Bund zu (Telefondienstmonopol) ." Id. For a translation, see infra note 144. 
115. "As far as telecommunications services are concerned, the Deutsche Bundepost's 
monopoly should only cover the telephone service in the future." Substantiation, supra note 
68, at 38. DBP's telephone line network, "with sales of ove'r DM 30 billion in 1985 . . . 
accounts for almost 90% of the DBP's telecom revenues of DM 33.4 billion." Haid & Muller, 
Telecommunications in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, 
at 162. 
116. Videotelephony is oral speech communication by telephone plus a video, presuma-
bly of the person with whom one is speaking. Video conferencing can be lucrative. It re-
quires a broader band network and simply takes videotelephony one step farther by using a 
different speech receiver/broadcaster and including more persons shown on a much larger 
videoscreen who :might be in several different geographic locations. It also permits the dis-
play of documents and other items on the screen for conference discussion. One can be sure 
that DBP will seek to include videoconferencing within its monopoly. I think both are in-
cluded within DBP's monopoly because the dominant purpose of each is that senders and 
receivers orally communicate with each other and hear the other's voice. The video and the 
conferencing aspects simply enhance the exchange of oral speech. These situations are 
highly similar to simple telephone conferencing, which clearly comes within DBP's monop-
oly grant. 
117. Videotex is a two-way communication medium using computers, TVs, or both con-
nected via telephone lines to a central computer. Pages of typed information are carried 
from their origin to a location over the telephone network and displayed on a television 
screen. The original name was Viewdata, and this term is still sometimes used. In a second-
ary sense, there is an exchange of "speech," which is manually-produced but not oral, and a 
quite broad interpretation of Telekom's monopoly could include Videotex. But neither voice 
nor its tones are transmitted or heard, and that is what one usually means by speech. This is 
a good place for the line to be drawn. Even though the DBP history is one of seeking to 
expand its monopoly, I am skeptical that such a broad interpretation of Telekom's monop-
oly grant will prevail because, in part, the EC is also moving towards a telecommunications 
industry without frontiers and is desirous of narrowly interpreting monopoly grants. Its 
"Green paper sees voice telephony as the only 'obvious' candidate for exclusive provision ... 
. " See H. UNGERER & N. CosTELLO, supra note 59, at 214. In addition "the ultimate objec-
tive" of Germany's Federal Government in proposing the new law is to maintain DBP re-
sponsibility for telecommunication infrastructure while simultaneously promoting as wide as 
possible development of competitive markets in all areas not requiring a monopoly so that 
Telekom can discharge its infrastructure responsibilities, see Concept, supra note 107, at 
39-62. "[T]he reform ... is based on the demand that competition should be introduced on 
the largest possible scale .... " Thus, Telekom's service monopoly "should only cover the 
telephone service in the future." Substantiation, supra note 68, at 31, 38. Consequently, I 
believe Telekom's monopoly will apply only to the exchange of voice transmissions where 
the sender's message is oral and the sender's voice is heard at the other end of the commu-
nication, irrespective of what occurs in between during transmission. Yet, the new law is not 
as clear on this point as one wishes, and the question is not free of all doubt. 
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through the publicly-switched telephone network?118 Telekom's 
monopoly presumably is limited to the transmission of oral speech 
and no longer includes such services as telegraphy, telex, text fac-
simile, or telemetry. 
2. Telekom's "Market Presence" Monopoly 
A third and odd sort of a "reverse quasi-monopoly" is granted 
Telekom in the area of "mandatory" services. It is not a monopoly 
grant in the usual legal sense of excluding all possible competitors 
except Telekom from an area, because competitors are permitted 
and encouraged to provide mandatory services. Rather, it is the 
reverse: other firms can enter the area and compete with Telekom 
in the mandatory services market, but the law prohibits Telekom 
from being driven out of the market even by the fairest of 
competition. 
By detailed ordinance, the Federal Government is authorized 
to prescribe infrastructural obligations for Telekom whereby it 
must either create new networks or provide specified "mandatory" 
services under tariffs dictated in the ordinance, or both, all on be-
half of the public interest.119 These "mandatory" services presuma-
bly will be financed by Telekom from its monopoly revenues. They 
are not considered part of Telekom's monopoly services, and com-
petition is fully encouraged by the new law in all mandatory ser-
vice markets. 
However, if it should appear that Telekom's supply of a 
mandatory service under the prescribed tariffs is "endangered" in 
the sense of not being "guaranteed," because Telekom's competi-
tive market position may have become "considerably impaired" 
vis-a-vis its competitors, and if cross-subsidization of the 
118. This communication situation could conceivably consist of videotex plus computer 
software that converts oral speech into written words displayed on a screen, which can then 
be transmitted via telephone line's to a similarly equipped computer for further communica-
tion. Software speech recognition systems are in their infancy and must contend with ac-
cents, jargon and words that sound the same but are spelled differently. However, Dragon 
Systems Inc. has now marketed a dictation system, Dragon Dictate, which allows a user with 
limited typing skills to work comfortably with any word processing software. The system 
handles thirty thousand words. See Science News, June 3, 1989. Oral speech and data and 
their manipulation and enhancement will become more technologically integrated in the fu-
ture and the distinctions between them will blur more and more. DBP's Telekom can make 
a stronger case for this and similar situations falling within its monopoly than it can for 
videotex. Although the question is closer, I think its resolution essentially will be same as 
that governing videotex, and for the same reasons. 
119. PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 25. See also supra note 95. 
44
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/4
1989] Germany's Telecommunication Law 109 
mandatory service is not possible because all divisions of the DBP 
show a persistent lack of profitability and DBP's Special Fund is 
depleted, then the MPT, after securing agreement from the upper 
house of Parliament (Bundesrat), is authorized to issue an ordi-
nance imposing obligations on all of Telekom's mandatory service 
competitors having more than three percent of the market. The 
obligations must be designed to restrain Telekom's competitors 
from driving Telekom out of the mandatory services market, but 
they can relate only "to the conditions of supply as far as coverage 
and quality are concerned and to the factors determining prices," 
and the "current level of business activities achieved by these en-
terprises must not be impaired."120 Any MPT order to Telekom's 
mandatory services competitors would clearly be anti-competitive 
and would operate in a market opened by Germany to competition, 
which by its very nature consists of a business activity. The neces-
sary business considerations as well as the ultimate decision that 
the MPT must make under the law are solely from the perspective 
of only one competitor, the DBP, rather than from an overall, neu-
tral market perspective of a functioning market, i.e., whether the 
market is satisfying overall demand or needs. Thus again, the new 
law seems to require the MPT to behave much more like a partici-
pant in the market rather than as an overall, dispassionate market 
regulator. 121 
If such an order were authorized to be given to its competitors 
by Telekom instead of by the MPT, the order most likely would be 
illegal, violating the competition rules of Article 86 of the Euro-
pean Economic Community's Treaty of Rome under the British 
Telecom case, which applies to commercial "undertakings" by gov-
ernmental entities offering services for a fee in a market open to 
competition.122 Germany's new law seeks to avoid this result by 
having the MPT issue the order, desiring it to be characterized as 
a dispassionate, neutral governmental regulatory act rather than as 
an entrepreneurial "undertaking." This procedure is highly ques-
tionable, and the EEC's Article 86 under the British Telecom case 
may well apply. But, even assuming the MPT's order were con-
strued to be a governmental rather than an entrepreneurial under-
taking by Telekom, the MPT's order may still be invalid. Article 
90(1) of the EEC Treaty applies its competition rules, including 
120. FAG, supra note 67, § la(2). A fourth quasi-monopoly position in German value-
added services markets is also conferred. See infra text following note 156. 
121. See supra text accompanying note 100; supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra note 58. 
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Article 86, to any "undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights," e.g., DBP's Market Presence Monop-
oly, stating that "Member States shall neither enact nor maintain 
in force any measure contrary to the [competition] rules contained 
in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 
and Articles 85 to 94. m 23 
E. Telephone Saturation and the Rise of Information Indus-
tries: A New Perspective 
At least since the mid-1960s in the United States and since 
the beginning of the 1980s in most of Europe, telecommunications 
have faced an increasingly changing set of conditions. Overall eco-
nomic growth, new technologies, changing procurement policies of 
users and network owners, and expansive growth in telecommuni-
cation-related markets have played significant roles. But also, 
change has come because a long cherished social goal substantially 
has been reached: establishment of a telecommunications network 
that would put basic, telephone voice service into every household, 
farm, or business.124 For years the goal of universal service has 
123. Would the EEC's competition rules also require the new German law to be ruled 
invalid (and with less direct anti-competitive consequences) where no MPT order exists 
affecting Telekom's competitors, but instead, funds derived from Telekom's or DBP's mo-
nopoly enterprises were used to cross-subsidize and finance Telekom's performance of a 
mandatory service against Telkom's competitors in a market otherwise open to competition, 
just as the new law provides? The cross-subsidization coming from a monopoly area and 
impacting a competitive market is clearly anti-competitive from a competitive market point 
of view, but not as directly destructive of competition as the MPT's order controlling DBP's 
competitors. Do Telekom's competitors in mandatory service markets have a valid legal 
complaint? I think not, because Article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty states that special "under-
takings," such as the provision of certain specified mandatory infrastructure services in a 
competitive market that the Federal Government can force onto DBP's Telekom, are "sub-
ject to the [competition] rules contained in this Treaty ... in so far as the application of 
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular task as-
signed to them," and so long as the subsidization of Telekom "would [not] be contrary to 
the [development-of-trade] interests of the community." This provision may insulate DBP's 
cross-subsidization of Telekom's mandatory services, unless it were to reach such unlikely 
magnitude as to impair the development of trade within the EEC. Of course, cross-subsidi-
zation of non-mandatory, i.e., value-added competitive services, could claim no protection 
from Article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty. See infra text accompanying note 152. 
124. "For more than 50 years, a guiding public interest principle for U.S. Telecommuni-
cations has been to 'make available ... to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, 
nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities 
at reasonable charges.' Over the years, this language from section 1 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 generally has been interpreted as the basis for the goal of universal basic voice 
telephone service." TELECOM-2000, supra note 2, at 75 (1988). "[B]y the year 2000, we 
might enjoy being part of an electronic national neighborhood, or even international neigh-
borhood, connected by several alternative telecommunications and information systems 
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meant a continuing expansion of an existing technology, with con-
siderable profit to domestic manufacturers supplying standardized 
network components, particularly terminal equipment. Most devel-
oping countries of the world are still working to achieve this goal, 
and substantial universal penetration of telecommunications in 
most developed countries is a very recent phenomenon. In Ger-
many there was only twelve percent penetration in 1960, but by 
1980 it was seventy-five percent, and today it is more than ninety 
percent. 125 
The European "equipment market is highly fragmented due to 
national procurement and certification rules and because each 
PTT insists on local manufacturing and technical expertise," re-
quiring "explicitly or implicitly, [that] their purchases have a high 
proportion of local value added. "126 Once saturation substantially 
has been achieved, the telecommunication industry faces a wrench-
ing reorientation, especially equipment manufacturers; otherwise, 
overall activity and profits will diminish disastrously because the 
industry becomes a victim of its own success. In such circum-
stances one or a combination of three possible events may occur. 
First, a PTT can enormously upgrade its network, thereby posi-
tioning itself for the future while providing new demand for its 
customary equipment suppliers,127 e.g., by expanding into such ar-
which blend voice, data, and video communications. The existence of such an electronic 
neighborhood could allow people to share interests, hobbies and information." Id. at 76. 
125. Schulte, Endgeraetekouzeption im Fernsprechdiensts der Deutschen Bundespost, 
in TELEKOMMUNIKATION IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 321 (D. Elias ed. 1982). 
It is obvious that the market [in Germany] for traditional telecommunications ser-
vices such as telephone, telex and telegram is coming close to saturation or has 
already become stagnant for telex and telegram services. Whereas in the 70's the 
number of new telephone stations used to increase by up to 2 million every year, 
this net increase has dropped to about 0.8 million a year with a declining trend 
during the past few years. This means a subscriber growth rate of only about 3%-a 
decline that can not be offset by the traffic growth rate in the telephone service 
amounting to about 5% every year. The growth rate of the telephone market in its 
current form will as a result be reduced to the overall economic growth rate. New 
markets for new or enhanced communication services will develop instead that will 
possibly achieve in the long run traffic volumes similar to those of the current tele-
phone service. This may above all apply to a telephone service offering additional 
features, improved voice transmission, picture phone and services for communicat-
ing texts and graphs. 
Concept, supra note 107, at 26. 
126. Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, at 25. 
127. 
On the equipment side[,] the Bundespost has stated that between 1988 and 1992 it 
will annually buy about DM 5-6 billion in sophisticated central office switching 
equipment, but only from two sources: Siemens and SEL (ITT's German Subsidiary 
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eas as ISD N ,128 IBN, 129 videotex130 and videoconferencing. 131 Sec-
ond, domestic equipment manufacturers can seek to export, so 
long as recipient countries are not protectively using their local 
markets to develop their own domestic electronic industry. Finally 
and importantly, manufacturers can become innovative and pro-
duce special equipment for sale to telecommunication's heavy 
users that can reduce their user costs, which tends to increase com-
petition, and like the export option, loosens the economic bonds 
tying together a country's PTT and its equipment industry.132 
A fourth, lucrative possibility also appears to be generated as 
saturation of the telephone market occurs. Unconnected new eco-
that is now owned by France's Alcatel). Approval procedures for attachment of 
equipment have grown more, not less complicated, making it particularly difficult 
for foreign firms to succeed in selling sophisticated customer premises equipment in 
Germany. 
J. ARONSON & P. COWLEY, supra note 4; at 180. 
128. The Integrated Services Digital Network is an advanced, wholly integrated net-
work of digital transmission and switching systems that permits the simultaneous handling 
of voice, data and graphics with great speed and accuracy. Currently all European countries 
are investing heavily in digitalization of their telephone networks. Current ISDN technology 
is based on a basic access rate of 144 Kbps (two 64 Kbps "B" voice channels plus one 16 
Kbps "D" data channel) and a primary access rate of 1.5 Mbps (Tl or DSl rate). The 
Council of Europe has recommended the creation of such an ISDN before 1993, one gov-
erned by common technological standards. See Council Recommendation on the Coordi-
nated Introduction of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) in the European 
Community (86/659/EEC), OJL 382, (December 31, 1986). 
129. The Integrated Broadband Network is ISDN plus broadband and is the 
"superpipe" specially constructed from fiber-optic cable and connecting every household, 
farm or business. It will carry a very wide range of television and other entertainment plus 
all other rapidly expanding telecommunication services. ISDN has a primary access rage of 
1.5 Mbps CTI or DSI rate, but the Broadband ISDN is being developed to carry transmis-
sions of up to 150 Mbps. For discussion of the development of, and demand for, broadband 
ISDN, see, e.g., Anania & Solomon, The Beauty and the Beast: Virtual Networking in B-
ISDN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1987, at 33-34; Weinstein, Telecommunications in the 
Coming Decades, IEEE SPECTRUM, Nov. 1987, at 62-67. The best discussion of the implica-
tions of broadband ISDN is R. PEPPER, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED BROAD-
BAND NETWORKS, REGULATORY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (FCC Working Paper, 
Nov. 1988). 
130. See supra note 117. 
131. See supra note 116. While videoconferencing can be done with ISDN, see supra 
note 128, extensive use of videoconferencing may require an ISDN-broadband, see supra 
note 129, to carry that load as well as other items such High Definition TV plus the regular 
telecommunications load. 
132. This is an important option for the potential development of competition. It in-
cludes LANs, which in some organizations account for sixty percent of internal communica-
tion flows, and such other equipment as PABXs, modems, multiplexers, concentrators, key 
telephone systems, network management equipment, microwave and satellite equipment. 
This option also includes lucrative W ANs (special wide area networks) that can span several 
continents. 
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nomic forces customarily appear in developed countries leading to 
the rise of new telecommunication information service markets, es-
pecially value-added services. Basic economic forces shift "sunset" 
industries, such as metals, steel, textiles and shipbuilding, to devel-
oping countries, replacing them with information technology in-
dustries. For example, "Japanese trading companies have recently 
been absorbed in avoiding becoming dinosaurs by paying very keen 
attention to developments in the high tech fields, especially new 
media."133 The rise of telecommunication and other services in an 
economy should not be seen as a full de-industrialization process, 
because services and the remaining or new industrial activities 
penetrate each other as industry buys services to increase its 
productivity.134 
A shift towards information production requires several fac-
tors. Developed countries tend to have well-educated populations 
skilled in handling information. The costs of producing publicly 
switched telecommunications, not necessarily equal to customer 
prices, have shifted sharply downward, which can make ownership 
or leasing of equipment attractive to heavy users135 by permitting 
133. Otani, Sogo Shoshas Shift away from Goods, Seek Profit in Service Business, Ja-
pan Econ. J., July 24, 1983, at 7; see also Martin, Japan's Trading Giants Look to Year 
2000, Wall St. J., March 31, 1986, at 22. 
Technological revolutions often contribute to shifts in wealth and geopolitical influence 
by changing the sources of industrial and military success. In this respect, information tech-
nology is proving no exception. Advanced information technology is profoundly changing 
global competition, both commercial and military, in such fields as semiconductors, com-
puters, fiberoptic communications, high-definition television, industrial control systems, 
robotics, office automation, globally integrated financial trading systems, military C3I (com-
mand, control, communication and intelligence), smart weapons and electronic warfare. 
As this transformation progresses, the United States is being gradually but pervasively 
eclipsed by Japan. In semiconductors, automated machine tools, advanced manufacturing, 
and mass produced electronics products, America's problems are already severe. More sig-
nificantly, the long term structural patterns of the interaction between the United States 
and Japan in finance and high technology imply a future of dependence on Japan. More-
over, the behavior of the embryonic though rapidly advancing Japanese defense industry 
suggests that this prediction holds for military technology as well as for commercial activi-
t ies. Although a strong response by the United States could soften this decline, the eco-
nomic and political costs of effective remedial action make some further deterioration al-
most inevitable. Ferguson, America's High-Tech Decline, 74 FOREIGN PoL'Y 123 (1989). 
134. "For the whole of the [European Economic] Community, from 1975 to 1981, the 
growth in volume of services bought by industry was between 3.5 and 4 % per annum. Dur-
ing the same period, value-added of industry in real terms increased by no more than 2.4 % 
per year." H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 89. 
135. Heavy users of telecommunication services include multinational corporations es-
pecially their corporate headquarters; bank, stock, bond and other financial service agencies; 
airlines; insurance companies; health organizations; large universities; engineering, design, 
law, advertising and consulting firms; and the media. · Telecommunication costs for these 
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them to exploit economies of scale.136 One consequence of the 
growth of information service industries is that they become one of 
a developed country's major comparative advantages. When infor-
mation service industries are most successful, the new markets be-
come characterized by an ability to provide individualized and 
uniquely different services shaped to fill a particular user's needs. 
To take full advantage of the newly emerging value-added mar-
kets, a PTT's common network that previously saturated its do-
mestic market by delivering uniform standardized telephone ser-
vice now must maintain that standardized capability and face the 
gargantuan task of dramatically transforming a significant part of 
itself into a highly flexible system uniquely sensitive to and capa-
ble of satisfying emerging special customer needs.137 This is un-
likely to occur, but it is the German federal government's ideal for 
the DBP. 
In most countries, the value-added service market can be sub-
stantially greater than the lost telephone-expansion market of a 
PTT due to saturation. But this market is different, and it works 
best with the flexibility and focus on individual needs served by 
competition, not monopoly. It is theoretically possible for a PTT 
monopolist flexibly to supply all value-added services, but it is 
highly unlikely from an institutional point of view. PTTs tend to 
be sluggish, bureaucratic . and focused on the uniform delivery of 
standardized services to heavy users. But most users of value-
added services need innovation, individualization and speed that 
traditional bureaucratic PTT's, such as DBP's Telekom, are not 
best equipped to deliver. So long as its conditions are fair and 
designed to achieve economic efficiency, competition among value-
kinds of businesses can be large, often ranking third after salaries and real estate. The mini-
mization of telecommunications costs has led to the emergence of a new profession, the 
telecommunications manager, who is charged with finding ways to reduce telecommunica-
tion costs. 
136. Telecommunication costs are a major expense to many business firms, so much so 
that it can become cost efficient to by-pass public switched networks. Recently, contracts for 
two W ANs, see supra note 132, confirm that economies of scale and related forces are oper-
ative. General Electric Co. contracted with AT&T for the installation of its own global pri-
vate telecommunication system for voice, video and data at a cost of $25 billion. Int'l Herald 
Tribune, June 1, 1989, at 13. Also, Merrill Lynch & Co. contracted with MCI Communica-
tions Corp. to obtain a private world-wide voice and data network. "The contract is esti-
mated to be worth $150 million. Merrill Lynch said it expected to reduce its costs by more 
than $100 million during the five-year contract." Int'l Herald Tribune, June 7, 1989, at 17. 
137. This is the exact task facing the DBP. The FCC's requirement of Open Network 
Architecture seems to be part of the answer; the development of such network flexibility for 
the market as a whole is one of its major goals. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying 
text. 
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added service providers most likely will better meet all of Euro-
pean business and household customer needs at lower prices. At 
the same time, it will spur PTT competitors to develop a greater 
flexibility and a lowering of their overall cost structures, which in-
evitably creep upwards as suppliers and employee unions share 
with PTTs in their monopoly profits. 
F. Germany's Turn Toward Competition in Value-Added Ser-
vice Markets 
After reaching one hundred percent telephone saturation, 
most telecommunication networks in developed countries shift 
away from being supply-oriented to becoming demand-driven by 
the emerging market forces. One new market, VANs,138 for exam-
ple, "tailor and package information closely tuned to user needs;" 
however, they only accounted "in 1986 for $944 million to $1,062 
million in Europe," but VANs are "disproportionately important" 
because they "will be essential for the future functioning of Euro-
pean businesses" and have been "projected to grow at 25 to 30% 
annually."139 As of 1987, the DBP had "only a small market share 
in the value-added market."140 But vast, lucrative opportunities lie 
ahead for public and private competitors because a "rough exter-
nal estimation of the dynamics in the German value-added services 
sector records an annual sales volume amounting to about DM 80 
billion [$40 to 45 billion] by the end of this century.m•1 Clearly, if 
138. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In Europe but elsewhere too, the term 
"VAN" is used interchangeably with the term "value-added service," which can be ex-
tremely simple or extraordinarily complex. In Europe, basic telecommunication services are 
those services transmitted directly by the network without any delays, basically plain old 
telephone, telex and telegraph services. Services that add something to basic service are 
called "value-added" services. Examples are telex or teletext with time storage and forward-
ing added, and electronic mail, which is a type of facsimile system where users can send and 
receive messages from one computer to another without simultaneously being on-line be-
cause the electronic mail box acts as a sorting office and stores messages until the addressee 
can retrieve them. Frequently, an additional value-added services term, "information ser-
vices," is encountered. It refers to such on-line services as database, data processing or other 
new services, which are essentially computer services directly transmitted over telephone 
lines. This can be an important category because many European and other countries tradi-
tionally regulate "telecommunications services" stringently, leaving "computer or informa-
tion services" less regulated. But, strictly considered, these too are "value-added" services 
and often are incredibly complex. 
139. H. UNGERER & N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 53-55. 
140. K. Newmann, Models of Service Competition in Telecommunications 9-10 (DBP 
Research Paper No. 28, 1987). 
141. The new and rapidly growing market of electronic value-added services would thus 
amount to a share of three to four percent in the overall national product by the end of this 
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DBP's Telekom hopes to achieve its accustomed dominant position 
in this rapidly emerging and competitive market, it must move 
quickly and decisively to garner the lion's share of the projected 
annual sales volume. One question is whether it will seek to do so 
by becoming the most efficient competitor or by using its non-mar-
ket powers, or both. 
Value-added service competition is a fact in the United States 
and is the trend in Europe and Japan.142 It has been endorsed by 
Germany's Federal Government Cabinet.143 For the first time, Ger-
many's new law has introduced the possibility of unregulated com-
petition into part of telecomunnications. Telekom is to compete 
with private value-added service providers; however, they in turn 
century and assume a higher significance for the economy as a whole within twenty or thirty 
years than has been achieved by the traditional communication services of the Deutsche 
Bundespost during the almost one hundred years of their development. The current share in 
the gross national product is approximately two percent. It has been estimated that the 
whole telecommunications sector including value added services will account for seven to 
nine percent of the national product of the Federal Republic of Germany by the end of the 
century, thus taking over the top position now held by the automobile industry. Concept, 
supra note 107, at 27. 
142. "In light of developments in technology and market conditions and the transfor-
mations in the United States and Japan, all Member States of the European Community 
are now reshaping or reconsidering the regulation of their telecommunications sectors .... " 
H. UNGERER. & N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 186. "The current technological evolution 
towards multi-functional computer-based terminal equipment, including ISDN terminals, 
will make the current trend towards competitive provision inexorable." Id. at 196. For Ja-
pan, see supra note 110. . 
143. The range of services offered today by private providers is still small as compared 
to that of the Deutsche Bundespost. This is due to limited market entry possibilities, i.e., 
the DBP monopoly. Although the Deutsche Bundespost ~s already offering some of its postal 
and telecommunications services in competition with others, it nevertheless earns about 
eight percent of its total revenue in the monopoly sector, thus covering the largest part of 
these markets itself, particularly in telecommunications. · 
The increasing differentiation in the demand for postal and telecommunications ser-
vices will .not allow such a concentration on one single provider in the future. It must, there-
fore, be an essential goal of the reform to develop a new regulatory framework aimed at 
increasing the diversity of services offered, particularly in those market segments where cus-
tomer needs develop and change rapidly. Such an enhanced offer will be of advantage to all 
customers. This can only be achieved if competition is increased and efficient use is made of 
its innovative effects. Competition can only bring about the desired economic results if an 
efficient infrastructure and a reliable and reasonably priced provision of basic postal and 
telecommunications services will continue to be guaranteed for all users. Only on the basis 
of these infrastructural services will equal opportunities be created for the development of 
additional and enhanced service offerings which will both reflect the diversity of demand 
and meet the needs of the general public. Thus, it is not intended to introduce competition 
as a general principle in all market sectors without distinction, since competition in these 
markets will only be a suitable instrument for securing benefits for all users if due consider-
ation is given to the infrastructural significance of posts and telecommunications. Substanti-
ation, supra note 68, at 2-3. 
52
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/4
1989] Germany's Telecommunication Law 117 
must rely on Telekom to supply them basic network services at 
reasonable prices that they might be able to compete effectively 
with Telekom in Germany's annual $40 to 45 billion value-added 
services market.144 The major telecommunications question now 
facing the German Federal Republic is whether this competitive 
market will become vigorous, robust and therefore, socially respon-
sible, or remain "competitive" in name only under the control of 
the DBP? 
In summary, the net consequence of Germany's new law is, 
therefore, to create three legal categories of telecommunication ser-
vices-monopoly,146 mandatory (basic),146 and unregulated (value-
added)-with competition expected to become the norm for the 
last two. 147 
IV. SOLVING THE MARKET PROBLEMS CREATED BY, BUT NoT AD-
DRESSED IN, THE NEW LAW: DBP's MONOPOLY AND 
CRoss-S UBSIDIZATION 
The new law is quite defective from a competitive market 
point of view in that it neither identifies the structure and condi-
tions of value-added competitive markets so they will be fair, effi-
144. FAG, supra note 67, § 1(4): 
Everyone shall have the right to provide telecommunication services for third par-
ties over permanent or switched connections to be made available by Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom. This shall not apply, however, to the operation of telecommu-
nication installations for the purpose of transmitting the exchange of speech of 
third parties; this shall be the exclusive right of the Bund 
i.e., the DBP Telekom monopoly. The original German text of this section appears at supra 
note 114. The only requirement made of a value-added competitor is that he or she "give 
notice in writing of the opening of operation as well as any modifications in or cessation of 
this operation" to the MPT who "shall publish these notices in his official Gazette every six 
months." FAG, supra note 67, § la(l). 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 102-118. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 119-124. 
147. While the German law actually identifies three categories of services, the law is 
confusing because, strictly considered, Germany identifies only two kinds of services, basic 
and value-added. The law divides basic services into those basic services that only DBP's 
monopoly can provide, "[v]ermittlung von Sprache fur andere dient," see supra note 114, 
and those other basic services that competition can provide but DBP's Telekom may be 
ordered to provide, called "mandatory" basic services. See supra note · 146. To further the 
confusion, DBP's Telekom can also be ordered or forced to install a new network to provide 
a mandatory service, and the new physical network installation also falls within the 
"mandatory services" category. Moreover, the DBP's monopoly over basic services includes 
more than the basic services described in note 138, supra, including all transmission of voice 
exchanges, even if delayed or otherwise "value-added." None of the German categories is 
strictly identical to the American categories of "basic" and "enhanced" services. See supra 
text accompanying note 32. 
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cient and function on behalf of the public welfare, nor does it ex-
pressly charge any unit or Minister of government with that 
task-a task similar to the one discharged by the FCC in the 
United States. As a result, Germany's value-added services mar-
kets are clearly subject to severe possible abuses by the DBP's mo-
nopoly powers. The fledgling competitive markets are in grave 
danger of not achieving their social goals. The American experi-
ence with AT&T clearly shows that the transition from monopoly 
to competition requires careful, stringent regulatory controls over 
dominant carriers when creating competitive markets; otherwise, 
socially beneficial competition simply will not ensue, a vital point 
hazardously ignored by Germany's new law~ 
One prerequisite to competition efficiently performing in be-
half of the public interest is that enough genuine competitors exist 
in the market. Competitors demand equal access to equal opportu-
nities in fairly structured, fully open markets. If the necessary 
market conditions fail to exist, competitors may refuse to enter 
into value-added competition with the result that a major goal of 
Germany's new law will not be achieved. The resulting "market" 
will be one in name only and simply will not perform on behalf of 
the public interest.148 For example, without adequate controls, 
DBP's Telekom may take advantage of the new German law that 
expressly authorizes it to cross-subsidize; i.e., the use of "revenues 
from monopoly services for the benefit of competitive services shall 
be permissible. "149 In an excess of zeal to establish itself as the 
unquestioned dominant firm in most of Germany's lucrative, 
emerging value-added markets, Telekom easily could be tempted 
to use its cross-subsidization authority. Only one weak, highly 
cumbersome and unpredictable protection exists for DBP's com-
petitors, and it is only against predatory pricing150 by Telekom, 
148. The FCC has faced similar problems. For attempts by the FCC to create the nec-
essary market conditions, see supra text accompanying notes 32-52. Germany's MPT and its 
Federal Government Cabinet have power to issue ordinances having the force of law, and 
would do well to seize the initiative and to emulate the FCC. 
149. PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 37(4). "Ein Ausgleich zwischen den Diensten nach 
Absatz 2 [Ein Ausgleich zwischen den Diensten eines Unternehmens ist zuliissig} oder 
zwischen den Unternehmen nach Absatz 3 [Zwischen den Unternehmen ist ein Finanzaus-
gleich vorzunehmen] aus Monopoldiensten zungusten von Wettbewerbsdiensten ist zuliis-
sig." See also supra text beginning at note 34. 
150. Broadly, predatory pricing is pricing services at a level usually below cost calcu-
lated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient competitor. See R. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 188-89 (1976). The Supreme Court of the 
United States has stated that "[p]redatory pricing may be defined as pricing below appro-
priate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the shortrun and reduc-
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which is frowned on by the new law,151 leaving untouched DBP's 
other uses of its cross-subsidization powers. Moreover, a non-pred-
atory, oligopolistic pricing policy would not come within the new 
law's protection against predatory pricing, and easily could be seen 
by the DBP as a means of using its power to achieve its accus-
tomed lion's share of the lucrative value-added markets. There 
seems to be very little protection for DBP's competitors in Ger-
many's new law. 
DBP's value-added competitors may have to turn to the EEC 
for effective protection. It seems that cross-subsidization by the 
DBP, without predatory or oligopolistic pricing, may be held by 
the EEC's Court of Justice to violate Article 86 of the EEC Char-
ter under the British Telecom case. 152 But, is it at all likely that 
potential DBP competitors will immediately, before the DBP en-
trenches itself, actually fight a lawsuit, at considerable expense to 
themselves, simply to obtain the right to enter the German value-
ing competition in the long run." Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 
(1986). Predatory pricing is illegal under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, 
and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C § 13(a) (however the Act does not apply to ser-
vices), the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(1), (2), and various state antitrust 
and unfair competition acts gathered in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) i1i1 6500-6855. The FCC 
repeatedly has declared that one of its regulatory goals is to eliminate predatory pricing, 
especially by dominant carriers. See, e.g., Guidelines for Dominant Carriers' MTS Rates and 
Rate Structure Plans: Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Docket 84-1235, 50 Fed. Reg. 
42,945 (1985); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers: Notice Of Pro-
posed Rule Making, CC Docket 87-313, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5208 i1i1 48-51 (1987). 
151. PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 37(4). The sentences immediately following DBP's 
authorization to cross-subsidize in § 37(4) indict DBP pricing below cost stating: 
If a persistent [sic] deficit [by DBP] in the competitive sector impairs the competi-
tive possibilities of other [competitive] enterprises in the market without any justi-
fiable reason, the Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, in consulta-
tion with the Federal Minister of Economics . . . shall take the necessary measures 
to eliminate this impairment. The Federal Minister of Economics, in consultation 
with the Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, shall decide whether 
there is a case of inadmissible impairment~ If the performance of this task so re-
quires, the Federal Minister of Economics shall call in the Federal Cartel Office 
which, according to § 46 of the Law Against Restraints on Competition, is author-
ized to decide on such matters. The foregoing provisions shall not give any rights to 
third parties; the applicable law on competition shall remain unaffected. 
For reasons too lengthy to explore here, substantial opinion exists that after Germany's new 
law, as before, the DBP's Telekom, a governmentally-owned and controlled entity with its 
contracts possibly specified by law, may not fully come within the scope of the German 
antitrust statutes. Even if it does, the new law expressly grants authority to cross-subsidize 
but, as shown above, not to the point of predatory pricing. Presumably, only cross-subsi-
dized predatory pricing would come within the antitrust laws, assuming they apply to 
Telekom at all. That is a very weak and cumbersome protection for a competitor. 
152. See supra note 58. Article 37(1) might also be implicated. See supra note 71. Cf. 
discussion in note 123, supra. 
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added markets on fairer market conditions, or will they simply in-
vest elsewhere leaving the German market primarily to the DBP's 
Telekom? 
Cross-subsidization need not always take so crass a form as 
the DBP's outright use of its monopoly revenues to undermine its 
competitors in the new competitive markets. Cross-subsidization 
and non-competitive pricing can occur simply by Telekom selling 
itself the use of that part of its own monopoly network used for 
marketing its own value-added services at prices significantly lower 
than those charged to its value-added market competitors.163 No 
provision of Germany's new law expressly requires Telekom to 
publicly reveal the prices it charges itself for its own network ser-
vices, which is an obvious defect from an open, competitive market 
point of view. By ordinance, however, the MPT with the Federal 
Government Cabinet can and should seize the opportunity now to 
ordain such disclosure,164 as the FCC has in the United States.166 
But information alone is not enough. It is crucial from a competi-
tive market point of view that the same fair price for the use of 
Telekom's monopoly network be established equally for all value-
added market competitors, including Telekom. This can, and 
should, be achieved by an ordinance requiring a very narrow-range 
of rate banding166 for Telekom's fair and equal sale of its network 
usage to itself and others. The ordinance also ought to prescribe a 
153. Or cross-subsidization effectively could occur if Telekom should decide to use "cre-
ative" accounting techniques and shift its value-added costs backward from the competitive 
sector to the monopoly sector, thereby permitting it to charge a lower price in the competi-
tive market while being assured that its tariffs in the monopoly area will cover its costs 
there. Neither situation comes within the meager protection afforded DBP's competitors by 
PostVerfG § 37(4) applying to cross-subsidization, see supra note 151, but conceivably could 
come within the British Telecom case, if that case is liberally applied. See supra notes 58, 
152, 
154 .. PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 30. 
155. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
156. Rate banding means that a narrow range of minimum and maximum price 
levels-price caps-are specified in a tariff. It has been used to regulate A T&T's intrastate 
inter-LATA long distance service prices. Without floors and ceilings for its prices, a monop-
oly seller of network usage can sell one or more services below cost to compete more effec-
tively in value-added services markets, perhaps drive competitors out of the market or deter 
entry of new ones and make up its losses by inflating the prices of other services. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has suggested rate-banding as one way of handling this 
problem. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93 
(1986). Rate-banding does not eliminate all the problems of potential predatory, or roughly 
similar, pricing; consequently, in addition to rate banding, other effective proposals for elim-
inating predatory or near-predatory pricing have been advanced and should be implemented 
by Germany. See, e.g., Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Pre-
vention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979). 
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system of accounting that would prevent Telekom from pushing · 
some of its costs backwards from value-added competitive markets 
into its rate-assured monopoly area, thereby attacking another 
form of cross-subsidization. 
If Germany genuinely desires to deliver value-added services 
most effectively through competitive markets, then Telekom's 
prices for the use of its network by value-added market competi-
tors must be cost-based,167 not monopoly price-based. Additionally, 
all market competitors should be equally able to lease Telekom 
lines at an equal, fiat rate per line. The rate should also be cost-
based, and therefore, related to efficiency, rather than be usage-
sensitive, as is so favored by the DBP. Usage-sensitive rates de-
crease economic efficiency since the cost to Telekom of providing a 
fixed connection to a network line for a value-added competitor is 
not related to the amount of use given that line. If usage-sensitive 
leased-line rates are charged to Telekom's value-added competi-
tors, it will result in an extra, undeserved windfall of funds to 
Telekom. Telekom can extract the windfall solely because of its 
grant of a network monopoly. This is fundamentally anti-competi-
tive and is not necessary to maintain DBP's network monopoly. 
The windfall funds can be used unfairly by Telekom to finance its 
own value-added services that are in competition with the private 
competitors who originally paid Telekom its unfair windfall in or-
der to hook-up to the Telekom network.168 This situation can, and 
should, be avoided by a proper ordinance issued by the MPT and 
the Federal Government Cabinet. 
Telekom necessarily will have important technical and busi-
157. The literature on cost-based pricing is abundant. See, e.g., Baumol & Walton, Full 
Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 YALE L.J. 639 (1973); Baumol & Brad-
ford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. EcoN. REV. 265 (1970). See 
also Baumol, supra note 156. 
158. The DBP introduced usage-sensitive private line tariffs in 1981. Neumann & Wie-
land, Competition and Social Objectives 10, 15-16 (DBP Research Paper No. 14, Sept. 
1985). Usage-sensitive rates are grudgingly accepted by the EEC's Green Paper and by the 
European Commission; both prefer flat-rate, cost-based private line leasing. See H. UNGERER 
& N. COSTELLO, supra note 59, at 207-10. Flat rates are the practice in the United States, 
see supra text accompanying note 27, and Germany's Federal Government Cabinet equivo-
cally has indicated it wants to move in that direction. Concept, supra note 107, at 84. 
The usage-sensitive rate structure so much desired by the DBP is non-linear. The user 
pays a fixed monthly charge for a minimum amount of usage plus an additional charge 
depending upon the amount of additional usage. The usage-sensitive part of the rate struc-
ture is "harmonized" with telephone call charges which also are usage-sensitive, and which 
means that the DBP tariffs its service substitutes at similar prices. The following diagram, 
adapted from Neumann & Wieland, supra, at 10, illustrates the DBP's usage-sensitive pri-
vate line rates: 
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ness information about all of its value-added competitors because 
they all must give this information in order to interconnect with 
Telekom. Further, Telekom obtains additional information when it 
monitors the line for billing and other purposes. No Telekom com-
petitor will have an equal amount of information about its compet-
itors. Telekom, therefore, has another unfair competitive advan-
tage in the value-added market, again derived solely from its 
network monopoly but not necessary for it. This unfair competitive 
advantage should be eliminated by ordinance, just as the FCC has 
eliminated such advantages in the United States.159 
By law, Telekom has two monopolies. All of its value-added 
market competitors in Germany, including foreign PTT's and 
Telekom itself, necessarily must use Telekom's network monopoly, 
which along with Telekom's voice-transmission monopoly is the 
USER 
COST 
b 
a 
x 
Usage-Sensitive Private Line Tariff 
80 h' 
switched 
network 
usage-sensitive 
private line rate 
fiat rate 
cost to DPB 
to provide a 
private line 
USAGE 
(hours per month) 
At h, a user is indifferent to using the switched network or leasing a private usage-
sensitive line. At 80 hours, the minimum amount of hour usage permitted for a flat rate 
charge, the DBP has made it in the user's interest to lease a line as it also has at h'. But 
note that with information obtained about its value-added competitor's usage, DBP can 
subsequently adjust this 80-hour figure as well as the rate per hour sharing them but still 
allowing enough to attract user interest, all to DBP's advantage. The user's actual traffic 
demand is assumed to be h '. If a value-added services competitor having the uses identified 
by the diagram leases a line, the money represented by area e-b'-a' must be paid over to 
Telekom in addition to the flat rate fee. Interestingly, the more successful the competitor is 
in the value-added market, the greater will be his network usage, and, of course, the greater 
will be DBP's monopoly receipts under the scheme due to its taking advantage of its value-
added competitor's greater efficiency and success. The DBP seeks to justify usage-sensitive 
rates as a means of preventing "cream skimming," see supra note 102. Britain prevents it by 
simply forbidding the resale of flat-rate, leased lines, but under the DBP's scheme cream 
skimming is not eliminated. A user at h can obtain the minimum 80 hours of usage at the 
flat-rate cost and then "cream skim" the area d-f-e, and the usage-sensitive user at h' can 
"cream-skim" the whole area d-e-b'-c'. 
159. See supra text discussion accompanying notes 39-44. 
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foundation for Telekom's economies of scope in the value-added 
markets. This is a competitive advantage due solely to the monop-
oly grants. Telekom should be permitted to compete in Germany's 
value-added markets only through structurally separate corporate 
subsidiaries.160 This requirement is necessary to shear off 
Telekom's unfair, monopoly-based economies of scope.161 There is 
not always a bright line between economies of scope and cross-sub-
sidization, especially in the murky market situation created by 
Germany's new law. If Telekom is permitted to exploit its monop-
oly-derived economies of scope in Germany's value-added markets, 
it will thereby obtain permanent, anti-competitive, unfair advan-
tages flowing solely from its legalized monopolies that will distort 
competition in the value-added markets. If Telekom is not re-
quired to compete in Germany's value-added markets only through 
a structurally separate corporate subsidiary and is allowed to ex-
ploit its economies of scope, which originate solely in its legalized 
monopoly grants, Telekom will have an unfair permanent advan-
tage in the competitive value-added markets that is legally prohib-
ited to all other competitors. This is a result presumably unin-
tended by the framers of Germany's new law, who sought for the 
first time to introduce a robust, fair and efficient competition into 
crucially important and lucrative value-added markets. 
A. A Clear and Effective CE! and Full ONA Are Necessary for 
German Value-Added Markets 
Telekom is actively creating an ISDN and an IBN is just 
160. Nothing in the law prohibits DBP's Telekom's Management Board from creating 
structurally separate corporations for value-added services competition; its Supervisory 
Board is authorized to recommend them, PostVerfG, supra note 68, § 23(3), and the MPT 
in conjunction with the Federal Government Cabinet may order them, id. § 30, just as the 
FCC has done. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35. 
161. See supra note 36, for identification of economies of scope. Baumol & Braunstein, 
Empirical Study of Scale Economies and Production Complementarity, 85 J. PoL. EcoN. 
1037 (1977); Pulley & Braunstein, Scope and Scale Augmenting Technological Change: An 
Application in the Information Sector, in COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ECONOMICS: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 105 (M. Jussawalla & H. Ebenfield eds. 1984) discuss empirical and con-
ceptual aspects of estimating economies of scope. 
The FCC did not relax its structurally-separate subsidiary requirement for dominant 
carriers until it was convinced that competition would not suffer, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 36-38, and it could substitute its CEI and ONA requirements to protect competi-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 39-51. Germany's MPT would be well advised to 
act similarly if a genuinely competitive value-added market is honestly desired because, un-
like AT&T's situation in the United States, the DBP has at least two legal monopolies, 
which make all the more necessary that competitive market structures be safeguarded. 
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around the corner. Neither CEI nor ONA are provided for in Ger-
many's new law. Independent of requiring Telekom's value-added 
services competition to be carried out through a structurally sepa-
rate subsidiary devoid of its anti-competitive, monopoly-based 
economies of scope, the MPT and the Federal Government Cabi-
net should seize the current opportunity and by ordinance insure 
the development of a genuinely competitive value-added market 
by requiring Telekom to institute CEI and a fully unbundled 
ONA, as has the FCC for dominant American carriers.162 Because 
the DBP has at least two profound legal monopolies, a condition 
not existing in United States telecommunications, the grounds for 
requiring CEI and a more fully unbundled ONA of Telekom are 
considerably stronger in Germany than in the United States. CEI 
and ONA are central to the development of an effective, competi-
tive value-added services market in Germany. The EEC may act if 
Germany does not, but may not speak exactly to the country's spe-
cifically unique situation, nor speak soon enough or in sufficient 
detail. In its Resolution on the development of the Common Mar-
ket for Telecommunications Services and Equipment up to 1992, 163 
the Council of the European Communities identified the "rapid 
definition, by Council Directives, of technical conditions, usage 
conditions and tariff principles for Open Network Provision" 
(ONP) as being of crucial importance for "creating progressively 
an open common market for telecommunications services, particu-
larly for value-added services." In January 1989, the EEC's Com-
mission presented a proposal for a Council Directive on the guiding 
principles and structural framework within which a substantive 
ONP might be created; this proposal, like the actual ONP that 
may be developed, will be subject to review and debate by the 
Member States before its final form is approved and issued as a 
Council Directive. 164 The desire of the EEC is to have an accept-
162. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text for discussion of CEI and ONA. 
163. 88/C257 /01, 30 June 1988. The importance of Open Network Provision (a weak 
kind of ONA) was emphasized by the European Economic and Social Committee's opinion 
on the Green Paper, OJC 336 (Dec. 31, 1987) at 46; OJC (August 4, 1988) at 36. The Report 
by the Analysis and Forecasting Group (GAP) on Open Network Provision in the Commu-
nity was issued on 20 January 1988. It was adopted by the Senior Officials Group on Tele-
communications (SOG-T) on 13 April 1988, and the Commission reported on progress to-
wards an ONP directive on 5 December 1988. (COM (88) 718). 
164. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for 
Telecommunication Services Through the Implementation of Open Network Provision 
(ONP), COM (88) 825 final, January 9, 1989. Issn. 0254-1475. In the Commission's 5 Decem-
ber 1988 Report (COM (88) 718) it summarized the general ONP requirements as follows: 
-harmonized ONP conditions should follow a number of basic guidelines: con-
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able ONP functioning by the end of 1992. The question is: how 
adequate will it be when all of Europe's PTT's are politically pow-
erful at home, advising their governments on telecommunication 
policy positions, commonly communicating and working together, 
influencing the writing of technical standards and software to favor 
European and domestic producers and having a strong common in-
terest in a live-and-let-live world in which each PTT monopoly 
secures the lion's share in its own domestic markets? 
B. The Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) Market 
The private manufacture of CPE has a long history in Ger-
many, but not infrequently CPE has been supplied to the user only 
through the DBP. With the exception of DBP's monopoly over the 
supply of ordinary telephone equipment, which lasts until July, 
1990, 166 Germany's new law now commits the entire terminal 
equipment market to competition. It provides that type-approved 
terminal equipment may be purchased directly, set up and oper-
ated by everyone willing to have it professionally installed and to 
observe proper conditions safeguarding the DBP's network, other 
ditions must be based on objective criteria; conditions must be transparent and 
published in an appropriate manner; conditions must not discriminate between na-
tionals of Member States; conditions must guarantee equality of access; 
-the development and implementation of ONP conditions should be progres-
sive. The emphasis should be on the development of harmonized offerings specifi-
cally suited for value-added service providers but available to all users; 
-the importance of the development of open network standards is emphasized, 
in the framework of the overall Community approach to European standardization. 
The reference framework defines the following three main areas for the development of 
harmonized ONP conditions: 
-definition of harmonized technical interfaces and service features. It is pro-
posed that existing technical interfaces should be used wherever possible. Where 
new technical standards are required for ONP offerings, the European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute (ETSI) should be requested to develop them, in ac-
cordance with evolving European standards taking account, as appropriate, of inter-
national standardization. 
-definition of harmonized usage conditions. Common usage conditions which 
should apply for ONP offerings are indicated in the report. These refer to a number 
of parameters including: provision time; contractual period; quality of service; con-
ditions for shared use, third party use, resale of capacity and network inter-connec-
tion, as compatible with Community Treaty rules. 
-definition of harmonized tariff principles. The proposal indicates a number of 
guide-lines on tariff principles. In particular it proposes that tariffs for ONP offer-
ings should be cost-oriented, be properly published, and apply to all users on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
165. "The exclusive right of the Bund to set up and operate ordinary terminal equip-
ment for use in the telephone service shall be preserved until 1July1990." FAG, supra note 
67, § 25. 
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users and the contents of messages, as set forth by ordinance of the 
MPT.166 Much turns on what and who will be certified, which until 
recently was the task of the DBP. Presumably, the MPT now will 
rely on a recently created, non-DBP-related office, the Central Ap-
proval Office for Telecommunications in Saarbrucken, which has 
been given responsibility for equipment certification. "Its stan-
dards are high, reflecting the Bundespost's interest in and tradi-
tion of high quality products," and if there is a "barrier to entry in 
the West German CPE market," it "lies in the artificially high 
quality standard embodied in the certification criteria", which "is 
reflected in the relative high per-line charges in West Germany, as 
compared with France.m67 Although the prices in the two countries 
may not be directly comparable because of differences in quality, 
"a lessening of quality standards, and leaving the choices of quality 
more up to the market would reduce the barriers to entry and in-
tensify competition considerably.m68 
V. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, telecommunications in Germany effectively has 
been a monopoly affair. One of the major goals of Germany's new 
law is to establish effective "mandatory service" and "value-
added" market competition. Yet, the law does not itself establish 
the conditions necessary for an effective, socially responsible and 
vigorous competition. Thus, much is left to be done. This is a grave 
limitation. However, the new law should not simply be dismissed 
out of hand as a bad law, or one necessarily destined for failure. 
Germany's new law creates a promise of competition for telecom-
munications. With sympathetic supplementation by the MPT and 
Germany's Federal Cabinet, it can be made into an effective law, 
achieving Germany's competition goals. The essential requirement 
is sophisticated supplementation that fills in the gaps in the law, 
that will produce an effective structure for genuinely competitive 
Id. 
166. Id. § 1(3). The MPT is 
authorized to stipulate the procedure for type approval of terminal equipment and 
radio installations ... to insure the proper handling of public telecommunications 
traffic. Type approval shall be subject to the condition that neither the transmission 
lines of [DBP] nor any terminal equipment or persons are harmed or endangered by 
the connection or operation of the equipment to be approved .... 
167. Foreman-Peck, supra note 53, at 169. "If equipment fulfills not only the safety 
standards but also compatibility and minimum quality requirements for certain services, it 
is usually certified within a few months," and for a reasonable charge. Id. 
168. Id. at 170; see supra note 127. 
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markets, devoid of built-in advantages for the DBP. To the extent 
the new law successfully separates and liberates the DBP from di-
rect governmental control and makes the DBP independent from 
politics, it also vitiates the German dogma holding that a specific 
set of regulations governing a public enterprise are not necessary 
because public enterprises under direct political control need no 
additional direct regulation. In this situation, the regulation of the 
DBP on behalf of creating competitive markets is particularly jus-
tified. By ordinance, the MPT and the Federal Government Cabi-
net can supplement the new law in many useful ways, including 
those suggested herein, but supplementation must come quickly if 
it is to be effective. Pessimistic reason exists leading one to believe 
that a Governmental Cabinet so busy with the more magisterial 
affairs of State will not occupy itself to the extent necessary and 
master sufficiently the detail of telecommunications in order to leg-
islate effectively. If pessimism prevails and effective conditions of 
competition are not created, it is quite likely that .the new competi-
tion will not deliver its promise. German markets will tend to be-
come geared to the DBP and to the needs of a few large data and 
other telecommunications users, ignoring other users' needs that a 
bona-fide competition would meet. 
Everyone agrees that some form of ISDN, and later some form 
of an IBN, will dominate the future of telecommunications. Be-
cause of the existence of centralized PTTs throughout Europe, de-
velopment of the ISDN has been progressing quickly. The basic 
question about an ISDN's technical design is: "Who should man-
age the format for advanced communications and provide the new 
enhanced [value-added] services and customer premises equipment 
to the network ... the central network, the major users or the 
independent suppliers of enhanced services?"169 An ISDN devel-
oped without CEI and a fully unbundled ONA would give DBP's 
Telekom power to manage format, to favor itself and to affect 
equipment sales favoring traditional suppliers. Without ONA, the 
ISDN will integrate and consolidate, and move larger shares of the 
value-added data processing market to DBP's Telekom. Then, by 
continually investing and reinvesting in "smarter and smarter" 
switches and data processing equipment in keeping with the ability 
of a sophisticated, standardized, huge, high-quality telephone sys-
169. See J. ARONSON & P. CowHEY, supra note 4 at 191. A major current question is 
whether the DBP will be allowed to "game the process.;' See supra note 52. 
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tem,170 Telekom's smarter and smarter but increasingly more uni-
form ISDN can dictate the kinds of interconnections that can be 
made technologically, affect competitors and aid DBP to garner 
the lion's share of the German telecommunications value-added 
market as that market grows in the future. This is especially if 
DBP is also allowed to retain its monopoly-based economies of 
scope. Moreover, "in general, equipment will be more standard-
ized, longer in its life span, and more geared to centralized infor-
mation processing. "171 The result is that the pace of the DBP in 
installing the ISDN also will determine in significant part the pace 
of development of German information telecommunications mar-
kets. In such circumstances near predatory or oligopolistic pricing 
is an easy temptation.172 Without CEI, and without a fully unbun-
dled ONA, the highly innovative, indivualized technology of 
smaller firms' value-added services become less and less likely. The 
major telecommunications and data processing firms, such as 
DBP's Telecom and other PTT's, are more likely better to service 
the needs of heavy users in an environment stressing bigness, relia-
bility and relative standardization, rather than meet the widely 
ranging but less lucrative needs of diverse, smaller users, which re-
quire rapid innovation and flexibility. This kind of development 
might be considered just good competitive business practice by the 
DBP. Ironically, in the long run, this development will probably 
favor Japanese, not German, equipment makers who deliver low-
cost high-quality, uniformly standardized equipment. This por-
trayal is a likely possible future for competition in German tele-
communications, or one similar to it. Germany currently is at the 
crossroads. Everything now depends upon the astuteness of Ger-
many's MPT, the Federal Government Cabinet and on their com-
mitments to create a genuine and effective set of market conditions 
for vigorous competition in Germany's new telecommunication 
markets. 
170. It thereby also positions itself for the future while simultaneously changing the 
mix of equipment sales and influencing purchases that favor traditional or domestic produc-
ers. See supra text accompanying note 127, and also playing simultaneously a powerful role 
in the German political process. See supra note 54. 
171. REID, THE ECONOMIC STAKES OF THE INTEGRATED SERVICES DIGITAL NETWORK 
(1984) . (quoted in J. ARONSON & P. CowHEY, supra note 4, at 192). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 149-157; supra notes 28, 150, 151. 
64
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/4
